





This is an essay, first of all, about storytelling in "private"
law-wills law, to be specific. It is also an essay about the com-
plex interrelation between "public" and "private" issues in law
generally. While this relation has been explored many times in the
past,' it continues to warrant attention today.2 Recent scholarship
has taken great interest in stories and storytelling in "public" law
contexts.3 To take but two examples, "outsiders"4  and poverty
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1. For an early critique of the public/private distinction, see Robert L. Hale, Bar-
gaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 603 (1943). For more recent
critiques, see Symposium on The Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289
(1982).
2. Examples of recent work attentive to the nature and significance of efforts to
distinguish public and private spheres include Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Pub-
lic/Private Distinction, 45 STAN. L. REV. .1 (1992); Joan C. Williams, Rorty, Radicalism,
Romanticism: The Politics of the Gaze, 1992 WIs. L. REV. 131; and Steven L. Winter,
Foreword. On Building Houses, 69 TFX. L. REV. 1595 (1991).
3. A recent symposium issue on "Legal Storytelling" published by the Michigan
Law Review illustrates this phenomenon. Many of the essays focus specifically on con-
stitutional law issues. See, eg., Milner S. Ball, Stories of Origin and Constitutional Possi.
bilities, 87 MIcH. L REV. 2280 (1989); David Luban, Difference Made Legal: The Court
and Dr. King, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2152 (1989); Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist
Speech: Considering the -Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989); Patricia Williams,
The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay on Formal Equal Opportunity, 87 MICH. L. REV.
2128 (1989).
Interest in storytelling in the law has not been confined to "public" law contexts.
For an overview of the literature, see Jane B. Baron, The Many Promises of Storytelling
in Law, 23 RuTGERS LJ. 79 (1991) (book review).
4. For a definition and explanation of this term, and of the concept of "outsider
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lawyers have argued that storytelling can be used as a strategy to
increase the power of those whose real world problems and every-
day experiences of oppression are denied by conventional doctrinal
approaches.5 These scholars, among others, have suggested that
stories and storytelling have great potential power to disrupt and
alter established, uncritical perceptions of what the world is or can
become.' By this process, it has been asserted, stories can change
how we understand and decide legal disputes.7 Yet, with few ex-
ceptions,' little attention has been paid to the means by which
stories will actually be made central to decisionmaking processes:
How will stories be brought before decisionmaking bodies? How
might decisionmakers be compelled to hear them? Examining
storytelling in the "private" law context of wills gives some insight
into these questions.
jurisprudence," see Matsuda, supra note 3, at 2323-26.
5. On the use of stories by outsiders, see, e.g., id. On the use of stories in poverty
law contexts, see, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning
Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107 (1991); Christopher P. Gilkerson, Poverty
Law Narratives: The Critical Practice and Theory of Receiving and Translating Client Sto-
ries, 43 HASTINGs LJ. 861 (1992).
6. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL L. REV. 971,
1031 (1991) (arguing that experiential narratives can provide "a vantage point outside the
legal system, from which one can glimpse its partiality or subordinating effects"); Richard
Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH L.
REV. 2411, 2413 (1989) ("Stories, parables, chronicles, and narratives are powerful means
for destroying mindset-the bundle of presuppositions, received wisdoms, and shared
understandings against a background of which legal and political discourse takes place.")
(footnote omitted).
7. See e.g., David R. Papke, Preface, in NARRATIVE AND THE LEGAL DISCOURSE:
A READER IN STORYTELLING AND THE LAW 1, 4-5 (David R. Papke ed., 1991):
[A]n increased sensitivity to various narratives in the legal discourse encourages
lawyers, legal scholars and citizens to conceptualize the law differently .... A
greater sensitivity to narrative enables us to break free of assumptions that law
is objectively created and applied .... We can more freely enjoy and partici-
pate in the ongoing process of re-creating the law.
8. In a pair of articles, Steven Winter has relied on cognitive theory to explain how
stories are used to make sense of and to communicate human experience. See Steven L.
Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal Power and Narrative Mean-
ing, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2225 (1989) [hereinafter Winter, The Cognitive Dimension]; Steven
L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for
Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105 (1989).
Others have also relied on cognitive theory to describe, explain, or prescribe strate-
gies that will be effective in persuading juries during trials. See, eg., W. LANCE BENNETT
& MARTHA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE COURTROOM (1981); Ste-
ven Lubet, The Trial as a Persuasive Story, 14 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 77 (1990); Albert
J. Moore, Trial by Schema: Cognitive Filters in the Courtroom, 37 UCLA L. REV. 273
(1989).
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I contend that wills ought to be, but are not, understood as
stories. The obstacles to this understanding of wills derive from
many of the same political contests-over the nature of knowledge
and meaning, over the relation between the individual and the
state-that have characterized debates over "public" law issues.' I
argue that if we cannot hear wills as stories, then we will not be
able to use stories effectively in "public" contexts. Testators al-
most by definition own property." They are sufficiently familiar
with the legal system to enlist it in their efforts to dispose of that
property. Wills doctrine supports their efforts, at least at the rhe-
torical level. Now if in this favorable context the law is nonethe-
less unable or unwilling to reach beyond written words to seek the
once living persons who generated them, then how likely is it to
attend to the much less familiar voices, the much less conventional
stories, of those who are situated "outside" the mainstream of
American legal culture? My aim is to sound a sobering note.
This Essay began as an exploration of territory travelled by
many before me: the problem of will interpretation and, in partic-
ular, the much-criticized "plain meaning rule.""1 My urge to revis-
9. On one level, this result should be no surprise. A major point of the critiques of
the traditional legal distinction between public and private law is that the "private"
sphere is not separate from, but rather is infused with and to some extent structured by,
"public" law. See, e.g., Hale, supra note 1. I develop this point in the context of wills
law in Section I(C). To the extent that the distinction between public and private law
collapses, one would expect the same sets of problems to appear in both "spheres." See
Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE LJ. 997
(1985); Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal
Reform, 96 HARV. L REV. 1497 (1983).
My references in the text to "public" law are not meant to reaffirm the pub-
lic/private law distinction. In using the terms "public" and "private" law, I mean only to
advert to the doctrinal categories that are associated by tradition (and not by any form
of logical or other necessity) with those terms--constitutional doctrines with "public" law;
property and contract doctrines with "private" law.
10. It is, however, possible to make a will for reasons unrelated to property. The
Uniform Probate Code, for example, defines the term "will" to include "any testamentary
instrument that merely.., nominates a guardian .... " UNIF. PROB. CODE § 1-201(56),
8 U.L.A. 11 (West Supp. 1992).
11. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ES-
TATES 319 (4th ed. 1990) ("A plain meaning in a will cannot be disturbed."); see also 4
WILLIAM J. BOWE & DOUGLAS H. PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 32.11, at
284 (rev. ed. 1961) [hereinafter PAGE ON WILLS] ("[W]hen the will is unambiguous, its
language is conclusive and exclusive evidence of the testator's intent.") (footnote omit-
ted). Professors Langbein and Waggoner have suggested that the common law "plain
meaning rule" might better be called the "no-extrinsic-evidence rule." John H. Langbein
& Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reformation of Wills on the Ground of Mistake: Change of
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it this terrain was not abstract. In a nightmarish six-week period in
1989, my father and my father-in-law both died, each leaving a
will. My father had written his own will; he (quite logically) be-
lieved he knew what it said, and indeed had complained about its
being "fair" in its provisions, but "not the will he really wanted to
make. But ironically, the will contained terms that in probate
proceedings might have been interpreted to provide dispositions
quite different from those my father said he had made. My father-
in-law, on the other hand, had his will drafted by an attorney. No
matter how many times I or the will's scrivener explained its pro-
visions to him, he professed not to understand its terms. Again
ironically, the will exactly expressed the dispositive objectives my
father-in-law said he had sought.
These two wills and their stories vindicate a widely held intu-
ition that the connection between the words of testamentary in-
struments and the intention that is supposed to animate them can
be extremely problematic. The problem is clearly larger than wills
law in particular. It implicates generally recognized concerns about
the nature of and relations between thought and language. It
implicates also concerns over power and interpretive authori-
ty-concerns often associated with constitutional and literary theo-
ry. Yet disputes about the primacy of "authorial intent" have a
particular poignancy in the area of testamentary instruments,
where the law's purported objective is to effectuate the will of the
testator. If state power to interpret is nothing else than the power
to impute meanings not intended by the testator himself, then
wills law's purported division between "private" power to decide
and "public" power to effectuate decisions cannot be sustained.
I develop my points in several steps. First, I explain how and
why the connection between words and "intention" has come to
be the central issue in traditional will interpretation doctrine. As
part of this discussion, I critique some of the assumptions (about
private intentions and public knowledge of them) underlying the
Direction in American Law?, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 521, 524-28 (1982).
I refer in the text to the "plain meaning rule" that traditionally governed will
interpretation at common law, not to currently debated views of "plain meaning" in the
context of statutory interpretation. See, eg., William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New
Textualism, 37 UCLA L REV. 621 (1990); Jerry L Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalisr,
and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 827 (1991); William
T. Mayton, Law Among the Pleonasms: The Futility and Aconstitutionality of Legislative
History in Statutory Interpretation, 41 EMoRY L.J. 113 (1992).
19921
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
conventional model of will interpretation. Next, I offer an alterna-
tive understanding of the process of reading and writing wills--one
that relies on the model of storytelling. Finally, I assess why I
suspect that this alternative understanding will not be widely ac-
cepted and why this skepticism might extend to the larger claims
currently being made about the transformative potential of story-
telling.
I. THE DILEMMA OF "INDMIDUAL" INTENT
The rhetoric of wills law portrays wills as exercises of autono-
my and self-determination. 2 As a leading casebook puts it,
"[w]ith few exceptions, ... [the law of donative transfers] rests on
one basic premise: In a capitalistic economy based on the institu-
tion of private property owners have the widest possible latitude
in disposing of their property in accordance with their own wishes
whether they be wise or foolish." 3 The state's involvement with
these wishes is understood to be limited: "The statutes and cases
in the field have as their purpose the discovery of the true intent
of the property owner, not to thwart it, but to give it effect." 4
The state's requirements with respect to wills should be
those-and only those-that enable it to serve its supporting,
implementing role.
The aspirations of the law of wills require the solution of two
distinct problems: the problem of discovering the testator's wishes
and the problem of neutrally implementing those wishes. The first
is a problem of knowledge. The second is a problem of power.
12. Mary Louise Fellows, In Search of Donative Intent, 73 IowA L. REv. 611, 611-12
(1988).
Wills law is not the only set of doctrines applicable to transfers effective at death.
Most people's post-death distribution of property is accomplished by a sometimes compli-
cated amalgam of probate and non-probate devices. See John H. Langbein, The
Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1108
(1984). The latest revision of the Uniform Probate Code seeks to unify and harmonize
the rules governing wills and other transfers effective at death. See UNIF. PROB. CODE
art. II, Prefatory Note, 8 U.L.A. 68-69 (West Supp. 1992). Yet despite these very dra-
matic changes, the right of a property owner to control (within limits of public policy)
the disposition of his property at death-whether by probate or non-probate transfer-has
not been seriously questioned.
13. ELIAS CLARK Er AL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON GRATUITOUS TRANSFERS 1
(3d ed. 1985).
14. Id.; see also Michael Hancher, Dead Letters: Wills and Poems, 60 TEX. L. REV.
507, 514 (1982) (describing the metaphoric description of the testator's intent as the
"polestar" that guides will interpretation).
15. Cf Dalton, supra note 9, at 999-1000 (describing the problems of knowledge and
[Vol. 42:630
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The problem of knowledge is addressed, doctrinally, by re-
quirements directed to the form of the will. If courts are to defer
to a testator's wishes, then they must have some way of knowing
what those wishes are. 6 The formal requirements of will execu-
tion-the necessity of a writing and of an attestation, for exam-
ple-are designed to satisfy this need.17 They function in general
to produce reliable evidence of the testator's wishes. This ap-
proach to the knowledge problem also addresses in part the prob-
lem of power, for the testator who manifests his wishes in compli-
ance with the Wills Act can be confident that those wishes will
actually be carried out.8 The problem of power is also addressed,
at the interpretive level, by doctrines focusing attention on the
will's words. If the testator's wishes are evidenced by the will's
words, then those words must be made determinative if the
testator's wishes are to be effectuated. 9
Unfortunately, as has long been recognized, the doctrines
created to serve the testator's wishes have the potential to under-
cut them. Will execution requirements, designed to ensure that the
state implements only those wishes that are well considered and
reliably presented, may deny effect to wishes due to minor defects
of form."
power as "central issues in any human endeavor of our time and place"). As is devel-
oped infra Sections B-D, a categorical distinction between the two problems is difficult to
sustain.
16. See, e.g., Association of Survivors of 7th Ga. Regiment v. Lamer, 3 F.2d 201,
203 (D.C. Cir. 1925) ("The instrument speaks when the voice of the testator is stilled by
death.").
17. The precise requirements are specified by statute and vary from state to state. I
refer to the requirements, generically, as the "Wills Act."
18. On the functional justification for the formalities of the Wills Act, see Ashbel G.
Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE L.J. 1
(1941); John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV.
489 (1975). For a critique of this justification, see Jane B. Baron, Gifts, Bargains, and
Form, 64 IND. LJ. 155 (1989).
19. See, e.g., Connecticut Junior Republic v. Sharon Hosp., 448 A.2d 190, 195 (Conn.
1982) (" 'ITMhe evidence of the intent of the devisor should be derived from the writing,
signed by him and solemnly attested; otherwise, innumerable would be the cases, where
evidence of mistake would be claimed and proved.' ") (quoting Comstock v. Hadlyme
Ecclesiastical Soc'y, 8 Conn. 254, 265-66 (1830)); Dempsey v. Holsen (Estate of Rosta),
444 N.E.2d 704, 712 (I11. App. Ct. 1982) ("The cardinal rule of will construction ... is
the ascertainment of a testator's intention from the will itself.").
20. See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 18, at 1-5. This possibility has been realized in
enough cases to provoke a variety of proposals designed to reduce the number and con-
sequence of the formalities associated with will execution. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note
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This problem recurs at the interpretive level. The notion that
the testator's personal wishes must govern commits the courts to a
search for the testator's subjective thoughts. But the formal re-
quirements designed to promote the trustworthiness of expressions
of intent largely limit the search to the objective words of the
will. 1 In the absence of a direct or inevitable correlation between
subjective thoughts and objective words, there is a potential for
conflict, in which either one or the other must prevail. The doc-
trinal structure of wills law thus has the potential to create a type
of zero-sum game, in which either (private) intent will prevail over
the (public) rules ostensibly designed to effectuate it, or the rules
will prevail over intent.'
As I explain below, the problems of will interpretation have
almost always been defined in terms of this potential for conflict
between subjective thoughts and objective words, between private
freedom and the use of state power to effectuate it.' These prob-
18 (arguing for substantial compliance standard); James Lindgren, Abolishing the Attesta-
tion Requirement for Wills, 68 N.C. L. REV. 541 (1990) (arguing for elimination of wit-
ness requirements). The 1990 revision of Article II of the Uniform Probate Code both
eliminates many formalities altogether and allows courts to excuse harmless errors in
complying with those formalities that remain. See, eg., UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503, 8
U.L.A. 111-12 (West Supp. 1992).
For statistics on the frequency with which wills are denied probate due to execu-
tion errors, see Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Will Contests-An Empirical Study, 22 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 607 (1987). For some reservations about Schoenblum's conclusions,
see Baron, supra note 18, at 159 n.7.
21. See Fellows, supra note 12, at 631 ("The states' dilemma is reconciling the desire
to discover and effectuate the property owner's intent with the necessity to remain faith-
ful to the words used to communicate that intent.").
22. Courts are often explicitly aware of this potential:
[O]ur holding in this case may not be in accord with the actual intention of the
testator-existing in his mind-but certainly it is in accord with long established
law that the court's finding shall be based on the intention of the testator--as
expressed by the language of the will.
Mills v. Wylie, 466 S.W.2d 937, 938 (Ark. 1971).
As Professors Langbein and Waggoner have pointed out, the zero-sum potential of
will interpretation is reduced by technical rules that enable courts to correct mistakes in a
variety of cases without expressly admitting that that is what they are doing. See
Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 11, at 522, 555. Some courts nonetheless are unable or
unwilling to use these rules and continue woodenly to apply the "plain meaning rule."
See, eg., Knupp v. District of Columbia, 578 A.2d 702, 704-06 (D.C. 1990); Lawrence J.
Rogers Trust v. Rogers (Estate of Rogers), 473 N.W.2d 36, 39-40 (Iowa 1991); Meredith
v. Meredith (Estate of Meredith), 782 P.2d 1313, 1315 (Nev. 1989). It is presumably be-
cause this sort of case arises with some frequency that the American Law Institute will
soon consider a proposal to revise the Restatement of Donative Transfers to permit ref-
ormation of mistakes in wills.
23. Even the most innovative of recent scholarly proposals on will interpretation take
[Vol. 42:630
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lems arise in part because the interpretive doctrines envision the
testator's "true" intentions as fundamentally inaccessible to others.
Thus, the task of interpretation is focused not on discovering the
testator's wishes, but rather on decoding his words-a different
inquiry.
The doctrinal obsession with the will's words is not an effec-
tive solution to either the problem of knowledge or the problem
of power. It is based on oversimplified and inaccurate presupposi-
tions about the connections between thought and language and
between the individual and the world of others. Wills law reflects
a distinctly "modernist" consciousness that causes it to embrace an
impoverished, lifeless view of the "freedom" it purports to ad-
vance. In this view, freedom consists wholly of choices, and the
only choices that count are choices of words.
A. The Role of Subjective Intent in Will Interpretation
Most discussions of will interpretation begin with the proposi-
tion that, unlike a contract or a statute, a will is "unilateral" in
nature. "The instrument purports to set forth the ideas and de-
sires of one person."' The task of interpretation would seem to
the connection between words and particular thoughts to be the central issue, though
they view the connection very differently. Professors Langbein and Waggoner would free-
ly allow reformation of wills' words to reflect particular intentions established by clear
and convincing evidence; their principal argument against the existing no-reformation rule
is that it denies effect to proven thoughts in deference to written words without serving
any legitimate state concerns for evidentiary reliability or Wills Act compliance. See
Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 11, at 528-29.
In contrast to Professors Langbein and Waggoner, Professor Fellows would abandon
the attempt to discover the testator's subjective wishes and would instead openly impute
intentions reflective of competent estate planning techniques and a preference for family.
Fellows, supra note 12, at 613. Yet Professor Fellows's proposal is animated by skepti-
cism about the possibility of drawing any accurate connection between the testator's
thoughts and the words used to express them. Id. at 631-34.
Both of these excellent and quite different proposals are responses to the problem
of the connection between subjective thoughts and the words purporting to convey them,
the nature of the connection between subjective intent and objective manifestations.
24. See, e.g., 9 JOHN H. WvIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2467,
at 231 (James H. Chadbourn rev. ed., 1981); Edmond N. Cahn, Testamentary Construc-
tion: The Psychological Approach, 26 GEO. L.J. 17, 17-18 (1937); Fellows, supra note 12,
at 611; see also Hancher, supra note 14, at 510 ("The trouble with the interpretation of
statutes or of constitutions is the same as the trouble with the interpretation of folk
songs: too many folks spoil (overcomplicate) the concept of 'the author.' It is easier to
think about a single author, a single testator.").-
25. Richard R. Powell, Construction of Written Instruments, 14 IND. L.J. 199, 207
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follow directly from this understanding of what a will is. "Some
one has spoken and we must now envisage what was in the mind
of that one when he spoke."'  The "ultimate goal" is to ascertain
the testator's "actual desires."'
This notion of the goal of will interpretation is entirely consis-
tent with the view that a will expresses an individual's free choic-
es-and thus is conceptually appealing. In practice, however, a
testator's thoughts cannot be directly discovered because individual
human will is a "formless substance."' "The intent of the writer,
the ideas existing in his mind, cannot be known to us with certain-
ty: we can only ascertain them to a greater or lesser degree of
probability from outward marks or signs."'  Chief among these
outward marks are the words employed by the writer, but other
marks may exist? If the testator's actual thoughts cannot be as-
certained directly, then the goal of interpretation must be rede-
fined to some degree. The goal becomes to infer from external
marks the internal thoughts they reflect and embody." In pursuit
of this goal, words and other external signs are used strategically,
as means to an end:
Every written instrument is the attempted recordation of a series
of ideas theretofore had by some definite individual .... Obvi-
ously the first task, then, is to squeeze out from each of these
segregated paragraphs, sentences, phrases or words, just as near
(1939).
26. Id. at 208.
27. ld.; see also 4 PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 11, § 30.1, at 2 ("The primary pur-
pose in construing a will is to determine the very disposition which the testator wanted
to make, to determine if possible his actual intent .... ").
28. Cahn, supra note 24, at 17; see also Kevin L. Keeler, Comment, Direct Evidence
of State of Mind: A Philosophical Analysis of How Facts in Evidence Support Conclusions
Regarding Mental State, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 435, 435-36 (noting that the law of evidence
supposes that "proof of state of mind is never direct, because ... thoughts . . . are not
directly observable by anyone except the person who experiences them").
29. Francis Vaughan Hawkins, On the Principles of Legal Interpretation, with Refer-
ence Especially to the Interpretation of Wills, in JAMES B. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY
TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 577, 580 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co.
1898); see also Fellows, supra note 12, at 611-12 ("The state . . . has no direct access to
the property owner's subjective will. It can only determine the manifestation of the prop-
erty owner's will through words and actions.") (footnote omitted).
30. Hawkins, supra note 29, at 580.
31. 9 WIGMORE, supra note 24, § 2404, at 11; Powell, supra note 25, at 201; see
Hawkins, supra note 29, at 580-81; Oliver W. Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpreta-
tion, 12 HARV. L. REv. 417, 419 (1899).
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an approximation to the idea sought to be embodied therein, as
is obtainable.'
Unfortunately, the strategy is imperfect. The least problematic,
most easily accessible set of signs-words-is not a perfect code of
signals." Even if words were a perfect code, there would be no
guarantee that writers would use the code with perfect accuracy.'
Complicating matters further is the fact that the words of the will
may not have been chosen by the testator, whose ideas are os-
tensibly at issue, but by the testator's attorney 5 The possibility of
a lack of exact congruence between external words and internal
thoughts is troubling. It reduces the reliability of the inferences
about intent that can be drawn from the words of the will.' The
Wills Act's requirement of formally executed words does not,
alone, provide all the evidence (signs) needed to solve the
problem of knowledge.
The obvious solution would be to supplement the evidence
contained in the will with other evidence bearing on the testator's
32. Powell, supra note 25, at 201; see also Howard W. Elphinstone, On the Interpre-
tation of Formal Documents, in 3 JURID. Soc. PAPERs 251, 251 (1871) ("Man commu-
nicates his thoughts and wishes by means of physical signs addressed to the senses. The
solution of the problem of interpretation consists in discovering from the signs made use
of, the thoughts and wishes intended to be expressed . . ").
33. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Disorderly Conduct of Words, 41 COLuM. L. REV.
381, 386 (1941); Hawkins, supra note 29, at 584-85; Holmes, supra note 31, at 417. For
contemporary treatments of the notion of language as a code of word-signals, see J.M.
Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743 (1987); Gary Peller,
The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151 (1985); and Joan C. Williams,
Critical Legal Studies: The Death of Transcendence and the Rise of the New Langdells, 62
N.Y.U. L. REV. 429 (1987).
34. Hawkins, supra note 29, at 584-85.
35. Fellows, supra note 12, at 633; Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 11, at 581;
Powell, supra note 25, at 208-09.
For a recent example of this phenomenon, see Redenius v. Redenius (Estate of
Redenius), 455 N.W.2d 295, 299 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990) (estate tax marital deduction
clause included in a will, contrary to the testator's intent, because the attorney "routine-
ly" included such clauses in the wills he prepared for married couples).
The role of the attorney in creating as well as recording the testator's intentions is
explored further infra in the text accompanying notes 62-70 and 78-79.
36. See Fellows, supra note 12, at 612 ("The state's dependence on the property
owner's manifestation of intent moves its inquiry from identifying subjective intent to
imputing intent.") (footnote omitted); Powell, supra note 25, at 208-09 ("The presence of
this word-man between the brain of the conveyor and the symbols presented for con-
struction makes it necessary sometimes to query the accuracy of the instrument as a
recordation of the mind of the conveyor.").
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subjective thoughts, to look to other external "marks or signs" of
those thoughts. Such a step, however, immediately implicates prob-
lems of power. The will's words, produced in compliance with the
Wills Act, have at the least been authenticated by the testator.
However problematic their connection to the testator's "formless"
thoughts, the argument goes, signs external to the will are pre-
sumptively even less reliable. 7 Resort to such signs runs several
risks. At worst, the wishes of others will control the disposition of
the testator's property.' Even if that does not occur, legal recog-
nition of signs external to the will jeopardizes the achievement of
legal objectives ancillary to intent-effectuation, such as promoting
compliance with the Wills Act and enhancing the stability of legal
language."
At this step in the analysis, the commentators appear to differ
in their conceptions of the precise relation between words, inten-
tions, and evidentiary rules. But the differences are only apparent.
All agree that if words had single meanings and usages which
testators could effectively be forced to use, the knowledge, power,
and ancillary issues could be harmoniously resolved: Testators
would express their wishes by writing them down, readers would
discover those wishes by reading the wills' written words, and
language would be used and read consistently over time. However,
the hope that words have unproblematic single meanings and usag-
es is universally regarded as utopian.' In the absence of a direct
37. See, eg., Connecticut Junior Republic v. Sharon Hosp., 448 A.2d 190, 197 (Conn.
1982) (expressing concern that admission of extrinsic evidence would do away with part
of the protection of the Statute of Frauds and leave every will open to interpretation
"on a claim of a different intent").
38. See, eg., Charles A. Graves, Extrinsic Evidence in Respect to Written Instruments,
28 AM. L. REV. 321, 326 (1894) ("[T]he court must interpret the will of the testator, not
make his will for him .... ").
39. Richard W. Power, Wills: A Primer of Interpretation and Construction, 51 IOWA
L. REV. 75, 105-06 (1965).
In light of the ritual, evidentiary, protective, and channelling functions said to be
served by Wills Act formalities, see supra text accompanying notes 17-18, the objective of
promoting Wills Act compliance is not unrelated to the goal of effectuating intent. Sim-
ilarly, the more consistent the meaning accorded legal language, the more confidently
such language can be used to express testamentary wishes. Thus, there is no necessary
conflict between these ancillary objectives and the goal of carrying out the testator's
actual wishes. Indeed, it is possible to see them as means toward achieving the intent-
effectuation goal.
40. See THAYER, supra note 29, at 428-29; Charles P. Curtis, A Better Theory of
Legal Interpretation, 3 VAND. L. REv. 407, 409 (1950); Holmes, supra note 31, at 417.
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or inevitable connection between words and the wishes animating
them, it would seem logical to argue that interpretation should
focus on the wishes. Yet, despite their apparently vehement dis-
agreement over interpretive issues, the commentators are surpris-
ingly uniform in their insistence that interpretation must focus on
the words. There is widespread agreement that although the Wills
Act empowers testators to express their "formless" wishes in a
manner the law will recognize, it limits their power to express
their wishes by manifestations external to the written will. As one
commentator put it: "The will, a unilateral act, has no existence
apart from the writing which the testator executes. He is the only
person whose intention is relevant, and his intention is relevant
only to the extent it finds expression in the will."'"
The task of finding the "expressed" intention can be ap-
proached in a number of quite divergent ways. For example, the
focus might be on the meaning a will's words might have "in the
mouth of a normal speaker of English,"'42 or on the "legal" mean-
ings of the words,43 or on the particular meaning the words might
have to a particular testator.' These divergent approaches to the
formulation of the task are accompanied by similarly divergent
approaches to the question of the nature and extent of extrinsic
evidence that can be admitted in will interpretation cases.'
41. Power, supra note 39, at 105. Some commentators have seen this idea as flowing
directly from the writing requirement of the Statute of Frauds and the Statute of Wills.
See, e.g., 4 PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 11, § 30.7, at 38-39; JAMEs WIGRAM, AN Ex-
AMINATION OF THE RULEs OF LAW RESPECTING THE ADMIssION OF ExTRINsIc Evi-
DENCE IN AID OF THE INTERPRETATION OF WILLS 1 (London, A. Maxwell, 3d ed.
1840). Others have seen the policy as relating to the protection of the integrity of inte-
grated documents. See, e.g., 9 WIGMORE, supra note 24, § 2471, at 239.
42. Holmes, supra note 31, at 417.
43. Power, supra note 39, at 103-04.
44. See Graves, supra note 38, at 323 ("[T]he true object of legal interpretation [is]
[niot the meaning of the words alone, nor the meaning of the writer alone, but the
meaning of the words as used by the writer.").
The divergent views, almost comical in the fineness of the distinctions on which
they rely, are summarized and contrasted in Albert M. Kales, Considerations Preliminary
to the Practice of the Art of Interpreting Writings-More Especially Wills, 28 YALE LJ. 33
(1918), and Sidney L. Phipson, Extrinsic Evidence in Aid of Interpretation, 20 L.Q. REV.
245 (1904).
45. For a summary of approaches, see Phipson, supra note 44, at 254-71. For a sur-
vey of cases which also exhibit a variety of approaches, see 4 PAGE ON WILLS, supra
note 11, ch. 32.
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Yet despite these disagreements and the vehement disputes
among those purporting to propose or oppose any variety of
"plain meaning rule," there is widespread agreement on the propo-
sition that the inquiry in will interpretation cases involves the
meaning-ordinary, legal, or individual-of the testator's words,
and that interpretation cannot be concerned with thoughts that are
in no way reflected in the words of the will.' Wigmore's state-
ment is typical:
Interpretation... is concerned with the sense of the word used
and not with the will to use that particular word .... If [a
person] has exercised a volition to utter something, then he is
responsible for such utterance as is in external appearance the
utterance he intended-whether or not he actually intended it.
On the other hand, the sense of his word as thus uttered-his
fixed association between that symbol and some external ob-
ject-may usually be given full effect if it can be ascertained.
That is to say, interpretation does not seek to discover the actual
wishes in the testator's mind, but rather seeks the meaning of the
testator's words-and may attend to the testator's personalized or
idiosyncratic uses of language. Reformulated in this way, the goal
of will interpretation is no longer to discover and implement the
testator's actual wishes, but rather to decode the testator's words
and give effect to-i.e., follow-them.4
46. See, e.g., 4 PAGE ON WILLs, supra note 11, § 30.7, at 44 ("The question always
before the mind of the court is not what should testator have meant to do or what
words would have been better for testator to use, but what is the reasonable meaning of
the words which he has actually used.") (footnote omitted).
On this point, there is striking agreement among those who see themselves as
antagonists. Although Hawkins found much to criticize in Wigram's treatise, his own
takes a remarkably similar position on this issue. Compare FRANCIS VAUGHAN HAwKINS,
A CONCISE TREATISE ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF WILLs 1 (1885) ("In construing a will,
the object of the Courts is to ascertain, not the intention simply, but the expressed inten-
tions of the testator, ie., . . . the meaning of the words . . . .") with WIGRAM, supra
note 41, at 3 ("[T]he question in expounding a will is not-What the testator meant? as
distinguished from-What his words express? but simply-What is the meaning of his
words?") (footnote omitted).
47. 9 WIGMORE, supra note 24, § 2459, at 188; see also Boatmen's Union Nat'l Bank
v. Welton, 640 S.W.2d 497, 502 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (extrinsic evidence "[ius not admissi-
ble to show [the testator] meant one thing when he said another or to show an intention
not expressed in the will ... , or to aid in making an intended instrument which was
not in fact made"); WIGRAM, supra note 41, at 3 ("[A]ny evidence is admissible, which,
in its nature and effect, simply explains what the testator has written; but no evidence
can be admissible which, in its nature or effect, is applicable to the purpose of shewing
merely what he intended to have written.").
48. See, e.g., In re Estate of Nagl, 408 N.W.2d 768, 771 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987) ("We
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The reformulation of the goal of interpretation as the discov-
ery of the meaning of words does not necessarily imply a rejection
of intent-effectuation as an ideal. Some abandon the search for
actual thoughts only because of the practical difficulty of finding
them.49 Others see words, despite their imperfection as a code, as
functioning acceptably well as signs of actual intent.' Still others
see the focus on words as a limitation necessitated by the doc-
trines requiring a will to be in writing5 -doctrines which are
themselves capable of effectuating and protecting private inten-
tions." Yet despite a diversity of views as to the reason, there is
remarkable agreement about the result: Interpretation's goal is to
discover the meaning not of the testator's will, but of the will's
words. Put another way, the testator's "intent" is really only rele-
vant to the extent that he chose to use particular words. As the
following sections illustrate, this can be a very anemic form of
effectuating the testator's wishes.
B. The Meaning of Words and the Problem of Knowledge
The intention to use a particular word, or to denote one par-
ticular thing or person (e.g., "wife") when one employs a given
word (e.g., "Mother"), are but two of many intentions a testator
might have in making a will. One can easily imagine other inten-
consider not what the testator meant to say but what he meant by what he did say.");
In re Gustafson, 547 N.E.2d 1152, 1153-54 (N.Y. 1989) ("Courts construing donative in-
struments are governed by a threshold axiom: a testator's intent, as ascertained 'from the
words used in the will' . . . reigns supreme.") (emphasis added); Gehl v. Reingruber (In
re Estate of Gehl), 159 N.W.2d 72, 75 (Wis. 1968) ("The essence of our inquiry then is
to determine the reasonable meaning of the words actually used.").
49. Chafee, supra note 33, at 401-02; Curtis, supra note 40, at 409; Fellows, supra
note 12, at 612.
50. Graves, supra note 38, at 326; Hawkins, supra note. 29, at 590, Powell, supra
note 25, at 234; see also Hebden v. Keim, 75 A.2d 126, 129 (Md. 1950) ("[T]he Court, in
construing a will, is governed, not by what the Court may think the testator wanted to
say, but by what his words actually meant, because his words were designed to express
his intention.").
51. See, e.g., Hawkins, supra note 29, at 602 ("A . . . will ... is made with the
knowledge of the command of the law, which requires the writer to express himself fully
and completely, and gives validity to the instrument only on the condition of reasonable
compliance with the demand which it has' imposed."); Kales, supra note 44, at 33-34
(stating that the common law "has unequivocally made the writing the legal act which is
enforced, and in consequence it is the writing alone which constitutes the subject matter
to be interpreted").
52. See supra note 39.
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tions that might bear on the terms of a will, such as the intent to
achieve certain overall dispositive objectives, the intent to "do the
right thing," or the intent to reward an individual to whom the
testator feels grateful.' Although wills law never overtly renounc-
es intent-effectuation as a goal in the ideal sense, intentions of the
latter sort become immaterial in the technical sense once interpre-
tation is limited to an inquiry into the meanings of words.' As
Thayer long ago pointed out, the definition of the goal of inter-
pretation operates as a rule of substantive law:
In so far as a thing is forbidden to construction, of course there
is no use in trying to give evidence in support of it: the fullest
extrinsic evidence, the most convincing and regular aggregation of
extrinsic facts, if offered to support an inadmissible contention, is
itself inadmissible; but it is so because the contention itself is out
of place.'
To the extent that the issue in interpretation proceedings involves
the testator's words, as opposed to his actual wishes, evidence con-
cerning the latter serves no purpose.'
This rule has clear practical deficiencies as a solution to the
problem of knowledge.Y To the extent that it renders certain in-
53. See Hancher, supra note 14, at 522 (contrasting the intention to write certain
words, the intention to cause annoyance by those words, and the intention "that one's
words be understood as enacting one meaning rather than another").
54. See MCCORMICK ON EviDENCE 541. (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984) (mate-
riality looks to the relationship between propositions for which evidence is offered and
the issues in the case; what is "in issue" is controlled in part by substantive law); M.C.
Slough, Relevancy Unraveled, 5 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 5 (1956) ("Though an evidential fact
be relevant under the rules of logic, it is not material unless it has a legitimate and
effective bearing on the decision of the ultimate facts in issue.").
55. THAYER, supra note 29, at 448; see also Kales, supra note 44, at 43 ("The rule
which excludes objects and purposes of the inducement [to the writing of the will] as a
subject matter of interpretation ... is a rule of the substantive law of interpretation.").
56. See LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET AL, FAMILY PROPERTY LAW 546 (1991) ("If
equity will not entertain suits to reform wills, no purpose would be served by allowing
the introduction of extrinsic evidence to contradict clear and unambiguous terms in a
wil.").
57. Some of these difficulties can be overcome-and extrinsic evidence admit-
ted-using established exceptions to and qualifications of the "plain meaning rule." For
example, extrinsic evidence is almost always admissible to identify the subject or object
of a devise. See, eg., American Cancer Soc'y v. Sutton (Estate of Kremlick), 331 N.W.2d
228 (Mich. 1983). Extrinsic evidence is also admissible to explain "ambiguities." See, e.g.,
Redenius v. Redenius (Estate of Redenius), 455 N.W.2d 295 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990); Mel
v. Page (Estate of Mell), 716 P.2d 836 (Wash. 1986). Such evidence is also admissible to
show the circumstances surrounding the testator at the time the will was executed. See,
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tentions legally irrelevant, some parts or aspects of the testator's
actual wishes will not be investigated at all." Thus, "[i]n countless
cases of palpable mistake, the courts have felt obliged to enforce
the Wills Act literally even though it is manifest that to do so
defeats the basic goal of the Wills Act, which is to implement the
testator's intent."59
In addition to this problem of omission, there is the previous-
ly mentioned problem that the actual words of a will are likely to
be those of an attorney. "[C]ommonly, the language of a will is
the testator's only by adoption; he forms an intention that he
communicates to his lawyer, and he relies upon the lawyer to draft
the appropriate language."'  My father-in-law's will exemplifies
this phenomenon. Although the will did in the end effectuate his
announced objectives, my father-in-law could no more have ex-
plained the meaning of its highly technical words than he could
explain the terminology used by nuclear physicists. Any search for
the meaning he intended the will's words to have would be futile.
As Professor Fellows has pointed out, this problem of "remoteness
between property owners and the instruments purporting to reflect
their donative intent" is encountered frequently in attorney-drafted
instruments."'
The problem of remoteness further underscores the artificiality
of the inquiries of will interpretation, once that process is reformu-
lated as a quest for the meaning of words. A view to the meaning
of words not chosen by the testator is at the least an indirect way
to anything the testator thought. Yet to the extent that the attor-
ney acts merely as scrivener, "translating" the testator's own clear-
e.g., Hembree v. Quinn (Estate of Russell), 444 P.2d 353 (Cal. 1968). However, evidence
of the testator's oral declarations will usually be excluded. See, e.g., Estate of Utterback,
521 A.2d 1184 (Me. 1987). For a complete treatment of these qualifications and excep-
tions, see 4 PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 11, ch. 32.
58. Cf Kim L. Scheppele, Foreword: Telling Stories, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2097
(1989) ("[S]tandards of legal relevance, appearing to limit the gathering of evidence neu-
trally to just 'what happened' at the time of 'the trouble,' may have the effect of exclud-
ing the key materials of . . . stories. And this apparently harmless legal habit has effects
that are not at all harmless."); see also Walter 0. Weyrauch, Law as Mask-Legal Ritual
and Relevance, 66 CAL. L. REV. 699, 707 (1978) ("Both rules of evidence and concep-
tions of relevance act to exclude certain information, often of a human nature, that can-
not be subsumed under a given rule, and therefore have elements of legal masks.").
59. Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 11, at 529.
60. Id. at 581.
61. Fellows, supra note 12, at 633.
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ly expressed ideas into legal phraseology and terms, it is merely
indirect. The problems of omission and remoteness are problems
of finding through the formal words of the will intentions that are
assumed to have existed, albeit "formlessly," independent of the
instrument itself.
More troubling, however, is the possibility that even ideas
initiated by the testator are transformed in the process of being
"translated" into legal terms.62 "If language is intimately bound
up with the way we think about experience, then talking about
experience in a different language necessarily entails knowing that
-experience in a somewhat different way."' It would be comfort-
ing to believe that terms like "testator," "devisee," or "tangible
personalty" are just fancy or technical equivalents of "person who
makes a will," "person to whom property is left in a will," and
"movable objects." Yet the legal vocabulary may be less particular-
ized, personal, and accessible than "ordinary" words.' Thus the
legal terms may be regarded not as alternative ways of saying the
same things, but rather as saying different things.
Similarly, the legal categories and classifications that an attor-
ney applies to the client's problem may affect what facts "count."
The process by which "facts" are changed in the encounter with
an attorney has been described by one commentator as follows:
62. For example, one commentator has observed:
[T1he law can be seen . .. as a way of talking about real events and actual
people in the world. At its heart it is a way of telling a story about what has
-happened in the world ....
• . . [S]ince the story both begins and ends in ordinary language and
experience, the heart of the law is the process of translation by which it must
work, from ordinary language to legal language and back again.
JAMES B. WHrTm, HERACLES' Bow 36 (1985).
The role of the attorney in "influencing" the testator's wishes is explored further
infra text accompanying notes 78-79.
63. Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking About Law as Language,
87 MIcH. L. REv. 2459, 2483 (1989).
64. See iL at 2491 ("Like more familiar forms of language, law creates knowledge by
dividing up the spectrum of human experience into new basic categories. But this new
knowledge, like all forms of knowledge, involves a loss, a reduction of the particularity
of experience and the perspectives of other understandings.") (footnote omitted); Delgado,
supra note 6, at 2428 (the linguistic code required by the court for a complaint may ster-
ilize the facts and strip them of the features that gave them meaning for the person
filing the complaint).
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The initial naive description by the [client] ... activate[s] a set
of legal categories in the lawyer's mind. The legal categories are
tested against the raw description to find plausible fits . ...
. . . The description of the facts of. the case is constrained
by the lawyer's view of the available courses of legal action ....
The lawyer researches the legal doctrine pertaining to those
categories that have been shown to be relevant in the first itera-
tion .... The process of matching potentially relevant legal
materials against the facts as described by the [client] results in
highlighting certain facts, downplaying others, and omitting the
irrelevant ones.'
The reconstruction of his ideas in terms of legal categories
may cause the client to perceive the reconstructed version as re-
moved from his life.' The client who approaches an attorney
about a will may do so because of a recent death in his family,.7
but the enormous emotional significance of that event to the client
may be completely irrelevant to the attorney in drafting the
client's will.' Professor Thomas Shaffer has suggested that effec-
tive testamentary counseling "is a matter of helping the client to
accept, recognize and clarify... negative feelings" about death,
but "this critical beginning is evaded as long as possible and oc-
curs very late in the typical will interview."'  In some settings,
"clients largely talk past their lawyers, and interpretive activity
65. KIM L. SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SEcRETS 97-98 (1988) (footnotes omitted); see also
Douglas W. Maynard, Narratives and Narrative Structure in Plea Bargaining, 22 LAW &
SOC'Y REV. 449, 475-76 (1988) (noting that in plea bargaining settings, "attorneys may
scan the material available to them as a 'case' for its 'storyable' characteristics" in order
to make choices about what will be most effective in supporting their respective bargain-
ing positions).
66. SCHEPPELE, supra note 65, at 104; see also William H. Simon, The Ideology of
Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 29, 114 (noting
that a client's need to adopt the limited ends that the legal system imputes to him in
order to be recognized by others may cause the "alienation of the individual from his
ends").
67. MARVIN B. SUSSMAN ET AL, THE FAMILY AND INHERrTANCE 204 (1970).
68. See id. at 215 ("Attorneys do not see themselves as psychologists or psychia-
trists .... They desire a normal business transaction."); see also Austin Sarat & William
L.F. Felstiner, Law and Social Relations: Vocabularies of Motive in Lawyer/Client Inter-
action, 22 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 737, 742 (1988) (In interviews concerning divorce cases,
"[c]lients focus their interpretive energy in efforts to construct an explanation of the past
and of their marriage's failure. Lawyers avoid responding to these interpretations because
they do not consider ... [them] relevant to the legal task of dissolving it.").
69. THOMAS L. SHAFFER, DEATH, PROPERTY, AND LAWYERS 97 (1970).
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proceeds without the generation and ratification of a shared under-
standing of reality."'
The point is not that it is wrong for an attorney to use legal
language, or to think about the testator's needs in terms of avail-
able legal categories and devices. The point is rather that these
activities affect the testator's own perception and definition of his
needs. The steps necessary to effectuating intent influence the
formulation of intent.
At this level, the problems of will interpretation illustrate and
exemplify a more general problem concerning the interrelation of
thought and language. On the one hand, we use language as a
vehicle to express thoughts. On the other hand, the conventions
and rules of language constrain in some measure what it is possi-
ble for us to think.1 In light of this dilemma, it is somewhat mis-
guided to define the goal of will interpretation, even in the ideal,
as the discovery of the thoughts and wishes "behind" the words of
the will.
C. The Meaning of Words and the Problem of Power
If the wishes said to be expressed in a will are to some de-
gree a product of, rather than the source of, the words purporting
to reflect or represent them, they are also in some measure a
product of the public power which purports merely to effectuate
them. The rhetoric of wills law tends to obscure this interdepen-
dence by focusing on the self-expressive aspect of will-making and
on the will-reader's obligation not to judge the wishes expressed in
the will. Traditional discussions of wills tend to emphasize the fact
that, unlike other documents, wills are ambulatory and revoca-
ble--colloquially, "a will speaks at death." To the extent that a
will is an expression of autonomy and self-determination,' what it
70. Sarat & Felstiner, supra note 68, at 742 (footnote omitted); see also SHAFFER,
supra note 69, at 142 ("Lawyers cannot perform even everyday psychotherapy for death
anxiety if they continue to treat will-drafting as a form of black magic, carried out in
Elizabethan English, with canned forms and ten minute interviews.").
71. This is a point that has received more extensive and sophisticated treatment else-
where. See, e.g., RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY 3-22 (1989);
Peller, supra note 33, at 1159-70; James B. White, Thinking About Our Language, 96
YALE LJ. 1960 (1987).
72. See, e.g., THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS 1 (2d ed.
1953); 1 PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 11, § 1.2, at 3.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 12-14.
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can be expected to communicate is the testator's unique and per-
sonal ideas;7' this notion is colloquially expressed in the phrase
"no will has a brother." The purpose of confining interpretation to
the words of the will-like the accepted purpose of the Wills Act
itself-is to protect individualism. Limiting attention to the reliably
evidenced, authenticated words of the will, and excluding less
trustworthy evidence, ensures that private decisions expressed in
proper and objective form will be protected against interference by
others who may disapprove of or resent those decisions. In this
model, the individual, solitary and separate, decides; the commu-
nity, committed to respecting the individual's wishes, regulates only
the form in which those wishes are expressed; others, however
dismayed or disappointed, must defer. To protect this allocation of
authority, the text of the will must be made authoritative.
The vision of will-making as a wholly private process assumes
a divide between, on the one hand, an assumed domain of individ-
ual freedom and, on the other hand, a world of others who must
be constrained from trampling upon that domain. Yet to envision
a core of private decisions separate from and independent of the
public institutions charged with implementing them is unrealistic.
The idea that interpretation discovers (some aspect of) the
testator's intent suggests that such intent preexists the law devoted
to effectuating it. But the very notion of "testamentary intent"
presumes a legal regime of free testation; in a society in which
assets owned at death are confiscable by the state for distribution
to the needy, it is difficult to imagine that people would bother to
formulate testamentary wishes.' The private intent that wills law
seeks to discover is in this sense a product of the public power
that purports to recognize it.
This observation is not offered to prove that a testator com-
pletely lacks individual wishes with respect to the disposition of his
property, but rather to suggest a more dynamic relation between
private wishes and the public commitment to effectuate them. The
ambulatory nature of wills may appear in the abstract to license
74. See, e.g., In re Estate of Pyle, 570 A.2d 1074, 1077 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) ("As
most wills are seldom alike, it is necessary to interpret each will according to its own
peculiar terms.").
75. Which is not to say that they might not find ways to make gifts before or after
death. On the policies underlying testamentary freedom, see Mark L. Asher, Curtailing
Inherited Wealth, 89 MIcH. L. REv. 69, 100-21 (1990).
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unfettered expression of individual choices; but it has quite anoth-
er significance as well: The testator cannot carry out his own com-
mands, but instead is dependent on others to read the will and put
its commands into effect. The testator thus must by necessity write
for others.76 This necessary consciousness of others and of the
testator's dependence on them has further implications for the
conception of a will as an instrument expressive of the testator's
own unique values. The testator's consciousness of a future au-
dience of unknown others surely affects, to some degree, the wish-
es he forms.
Many "public" forces affect the testator's decisions. One way
in which the world of others influences the formation of testamen-
tary wishes is through the intervention of an attorney-often con-
sidered a mere facilitator who records, in legally effective form,
ideas originating from the testator. However, the attorney's role
can be far more active. Often the responsible attorney brings to
the testator's attention an eventuality the testator did not before
consider, thereby "causing" the testator to have an intention he
would not otherwise have had. One empirical study found that
"[t]he attorney who typically drafts the will may have influenced
the testate's distributive pattern by suggesting that certain will
provisions are customary. 78
Of course, once the testator becomes conscious of a possibili-
ty, the decision as to the disposition to be made under these now-
anticipated circumstances is up to the testator, and the decision is
arguably no less the testator's for having been made at the
attorney's urging. In this view, the testator's signature at the end
of the will evidences the choice to adopt as his own the attorney-
suggested dispositive scheme. The large number of wills contested
76. Commenting on "orthodox" wills theory, Professor Curtis says:
The grave fault of the orthodox theory is that it assumes that the author re-
tains control over his words after he has uttered them. How can he? He knows
that his words are to be applied by others and in the future, by others over
whom he may have no control except by litigation, and in a future in which he
may have no part.
Curtis, supra note 40, at 423.
77. One set of reasons to question this formulation of the attorney's role is explored
supra in the text accompanying notes 60-70.
78. Mary Louise Fellows et al., An Empirical Study of the Illinois Statutory Estate
Plan, 1976 U. ILL L. FORUM 717, 722; see also SUSSMAN ET AL, supra note 67, at 217
(arguing that "it is impossible to overlook the fact that the lawyer, like his client, is a
product of his culture and that in subtle and unobtrusive ways he influences his client to
make the right decision").
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on the grounds of scrivener error suggests, however, that often
there is little association between the testator's signature and in-
tent to include the particular will provisions above it."
Even if an attorney is not involved, will-making is not an
.entirely private process. Wills are not uncommon in this society."
Will-making is to some degree a conventional activity, the typical
patterns of which are widely known."1 These conventions are not
necessarily explicitly perceived or consciously chosen; they may
operate before choice and, indeed, may in part "structure choice,
preference, desire, and perception."' Decisions thought to lie
solely with the individual-the decision to make a will at all, the
decision to give this or that item of property to one or another
person-may be influenced by the testator's sense of what he
"ought to do," or of what "most people do."' My father's com-
plaints about his own will illustrate this phenomenon: He appar-
ently felt he had to make provisions that were in some universal
or general sense "fair," even if those provisions conflicted with al-
79. See Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 11, at 521-22.
80. For empirical studies examining, inter alia, the frequency of testation, see
CAROLE SHAMMAS ET AL, INHERITANCE IN AMERICA FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE
PRESENT (1987); SUSSMAN ET AL, supra note 67, at 64-81; Olin L. Browder, Jr., Recent
Patterns of Testate Succession in the United States and England, 67 MICH. L. REv. 1303
(1969); Allison Dunham, The Method, Process and Frequency of Wealth Transmission at
Death, 30 U. Ci. L. REV. 241 (1963).
It is clear that the probate system has declined dramatically in importance relative
to non-probate transfers. Langbein, supra note 12, at 1108. Nothing in the literature sug-
gests, however, that wills have become unimportant or rare.
81. For example, all the studies cited supra note 80 showed that a large majority of
decedents survived by a spouse left all their property to the spouse, even if they were
also survived by issue. Where decedents were survived by issue but not by spouses, they
tended to leave their estates to their issue. Similar results were reached in studies that
asked people about their hypothetical dispositive preferences (as opposed to studies based
on examination of actual wills). See Mary Louise Fellows et al., Public Attitudes About
Property Distribution at Death and Intestate Succession Laws in the United States, 1978
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 319; Fellows et al., supra note 78, at 727-36; see also SHAMMAS
ET AL, supra note 80, at 207 ("Despite almost complete testamentary freedom, Ameri-
cans have whenever possible limited their substantial bequests to spouse, sons, and
daughters.").
82. J.M. Balkin, Ideology as Constraint, 43 STAN. L REV. 1133, 1150-51 (1991)
(book review) (emphasis added).
83. See JEFFREY P. ROSENFELD, THE LEGACY OF AGING 29-30 (1979) (arguing that
within the American system of inheritance the norm of free testation is matched by a
counternorm of devotion to the family);tsee also SCHAFFER, supra note 69, at 82-83 (sug-
gesting that wills clients feel a "moral imperative" to provide for dependents after death).
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ternative dispositions he wished in some less abstract way he could
have made.
Even if a testator chooses not to conform to conventional
dispositive patterns, those patterns may nonetheless exert an influ-
ence on the terms of his will. The testator is likely to be aware
that the world of others for whom he writes is also familiar with
the conventional patterns of wills and that, based on these pat-
terns, those others may have expectations about what the will is
likely to or should say. The testator may write to meet those ex-
pectations or to explain why those expectations are being defeat-
ed.'
The point is not that conventions or expectations determine or
control what a testator does. Innumerable factors unique to the
individual testator-his personal circumstances of age, wealth,
family, personality, attitude toward death, etc.-are all part of the
complex decision to make a particular will at a particular time.
Rather, the point is that awareness of others and their expecta-
tions is also an integral part of the formation of the testator's
"private" intent.
D. The Meaning of Words and Modernist Consciousness
A brief recapitulation at this point will help to locate wills law
and its problems within the realm of modern legal theory. On a
doctrinal level, the task of will interpretation has come to be de-
fined in terms of the discovery of the meaning of words. The
inquiry is considerably more narrow than might be expected in an
area of law whose stated object is the effectuation of individuals'
actual wishes. Yet the limitation of the inquiry has been under-
stood as necessary: If a testator is to govern the terms of his will,
then the will's formally authenticated words must control, lest the
Wills Act be threatened or, worse, others substitute their wishes
for the testator's. The problem is conceived as involving the ap-
84. The existence of expectations on the part of those who see themselves as the
natural objects of a testator's beneficence is to some degree confirmed by the estate
planning literature geared to the possibility of a will contest where a testator plans to
depart from typical dispositions in favor of family. See, e.g., Leon Jaworski, The Will
Contest, 10 BAYLOR L. REv. 87, 89-93 (1958); Jan E. Rein-Francovich, An Ounce of
Prevention: Grounds for Upsetting Wills and Will Substitutes, 20 GONZ. L. REV. 1, 64-67
(1984).
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propriate way to protect the private realm of the testator's deci-
sional authority.
Whatever its conceptual coherence, the meaning-of-words
model of will interpretation can be understood to reflect a plausi-
ble set of aspirations about the problem of testamentary "commu-
nication." The person whose ideas and wishes are legally determi-
native is not going to be present to explain them. If that person
knows exactly what he wants and says exactly what he has
thought, no explanation will be needed. His words-the
instrument's expressed commands-will represent, i.e., mirror, the
choices he has made in his mind.' Those mirrored choices will
then control, over the choices that might have been made by oth-
ers.
To work, the scheme requires self-reliance in the use of lan-
guage: The will's author must harness language to his ends. Such
self-reliance functions affirmatively to present the author's "inter-
nal" wishes to the "outside" world of survivors. It also functions
negatively to constrain those survivors from stepping beyond their
proper role as "mere" readers.
The affirmative side of the meaning-of-words model locates
the author's individuality within himself; his personhood must be
brought out through externally perceivable manifestations. The
individual is thus clearly bounded.' The negative side of the
model highlights whom the individual is bounded from: the world
of potentially threatening others, whose power over the individual
must be carefully curtailed. The doctrines of will interpretation in
this way seem, like so many doctrines of private law, an attempt
to mediate an assumed sharp divide between the individual and
the collective.
85. On the notions of representation and mirroring, see RICHARD RORTY, PHILOS-
OPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 257-312 (1979); Balkin, supra note 33, at 760; and
Peller, supra note 33, at 1175.
86. See Jennifer Nedelsky, Law, Boundaries, and the Bounded Self, 30 REPRESENTA-
TIONS, Spring 1990, at 162, 168 (noting that "the image of protective boundaries as es-
sential to the integrity and autonomy of the self is deep and pervasive in our culture");
see also Gregory S. Alexander, Dilemmas of Group Autonomy: Residential Associations
and Commmunity, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 59-61 (1989) (suggesting that "walls" can
function like barriers and that the dialogue necessary to creating genuine community can-
not occur in the presence of walls).
87. See, e.g., Dalton, supra note 9, at 1010 ("The underlying notion [of contract dis-
course] has been that to the extent contract doctrine is 'private,' or controlled by the
parties, it guarantees individual autonomy or freedom; to the extent it is 'public,' or con-
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In both its view of language as the outside representation of
inner thoughts and its view of the will-writer as an individual
isolated from the collective, wills law seems thoroughly "modern-
ist" in orientation." Wills law shares with liberal legalism assump-
tions that identify each adult individual "as a distinct being having
unique wants and a capacity for self-reliance .... Those wants
and preferences are subjective and taken as givens-free from
second-guessing by society. Society and the polity must both be
restrained from interfering with each unique self .... .89 Like
both mainstream legal theorists and their critics, wills law assumes
that interpretation must be somehow constrained and that "[i]f
there are no constraints, judges and other powerful legal actors
will be free to impose their values."'
Based on these assumptions about language, the self, and the
dangers of imposition, wills law seeks constraint in the text of
wills. In order to protect the individual from the world of poten-
tially hostile others, the meaning-of-words model of interpretation
limits permissibly searched-for thoughts to those that can be con-
nected in a more-or-less direct way to the formally executed words
of the will.
Ironically, this attempt to preserve the domain of individuality
from collective threat has the perverse consequence of abstracting
individuals, reducing them to the sum of their verbal choices."'
trolled by the state, it infringes individual autonomy."); Nedelsky, supra note 86, at 167
("The primary content of... [the] conception of autonomy [expressed in American
property law] is protection from the intrusion of the collective.").
88. See Dennis Patterson, Postmoderism/FeminismiLaw, 77 CoRNELL L. REV. 254,
266-68 (1992) (describing how, in the modernist view, "[ljanguage either refers to objects
in the world or is expressive of the attitudes, preferences, or emotions of the speaker";
to the modernist individualist, "society is composed simply of 'social atoms' ").
89. MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DFFERENCE 162 (1990). Professor Minow
argues that these assumptions are shared alike by law and economics scholars, rights
theorists, and Critical Legal Studies scholars. Id. at 162 & 165 n.59. Professor West asso-
ciates these assumptions with "patriarchal jurisprudence." Robin West, Jurisprudence and
Gender, 55 U. Cm. L. REV. 1 (1988).
90. Winter, supra note 2, at 1596; see also Balkin, supra note 82, at 1141 ("If one
separates social rules and individual will .... the greatest problem for jurisprudence is
what we might call the 'rogue judge'-the decisionmaker who wants to follow his or her
own political agenda, and who must be hemmed in by an objective doctrinal structure.").
91. See MINOW, supra note 89, at 162 (noting that the identification of individuality
with choice-making in effect dehumanizes those who, like children and mentally incompe-
tent persons, are presumed unable to form preferences); Thomas Morawetz, Persons With-
out History: Liberal Theory and Human Experience, 66 B.U. L. REV. 1013, 1020 (1986)
(Liberal theorists who defend neutrality offer a "thin" theory of human nature, "commit-
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Testators' only personalities reside in their potentially idiosyncratic
use of words. There is something deeply dissatisfying about a
system that protects individuals only by depriving them of their
humanity.
From an increasing variety of directions, the notion that drives
this unsatisfying system-the notion of self divided from communi-
ty-has come under attack.' Just as "subjective" ideas are affect-
ed by the "objective" language in which they are expressed,' and
"private" wishes are affected by "public" forces,' so the relation-
ship between the individual and the collective is less one of oppo-
sition than of mutual dependence. As Professor Minow has put it:
"Autonomy, even as an aspiration, is the invention of a cultural
and linguistic community .... As a psychological matter, the very
experience of a bounded personal identity requires not just one
individual but many, who help constitute the boundaries."' In
other words, "people do not exist in isolation, but in social and
political relations. People develop their predispositions, their in-
terests, their autonomy-in short, their identity-in large part out
of these relations." 96
Thus the "private" realm in which a testator is traditionally
understood to decide is not isolated from "public" forces. No
testator can write without consciousness of others; and that con-
sciousness does not limit, but instead defines the very "freedom"
he is exercising. The point is not that a testator has no autonomy,
but rather that self-determination is a process quite different from
ted only to the notion of persons ... as loci of arbitrary preferences .... Living well,
in this view, means being in a position to choose and to satisfy one's choices."); see also
Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 801, 807 (1991):
Now, you might think: well, this [equating people with the sum of their verbal
choices] is not so bad. At least we get to choose. We are free and we can
choose which way to go. But, of course, we are not free. . . . On the con-
trary, we (you and I) have been constituted as the" kind of beings, the kind of
thinkers who compulsively treat every intellectual, social, or legal event as call-
ing for a choice. We must choose.
92. See MINOw, supra note 89, at 192 (suggesting that the challenge has been made
in field after field of scholarship). The challenge is sometimes specifically associated with
feminism. See, eg., Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and
Possibilities, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7 (1989). The challenge has also been associated
with postmodemism. See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, The Problem of the Subject, 69 TEX. L.
REV. 1627 (1991); Winter, supra note 2.
93. See supra Section B.
94. See supra Section C.
95. MINOw, supra note 89, at 300.
96. Nedelsky, supra note 92, at 21.
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that envisioned by the traditional understanding of will interpreta-
tion. The very idea of freedom of testation needs to be rethought.
"If individuals are socially constructed, then their freedom will not
consist in thoughts and actions which exist separate and apart from
culture. Rather, their freedom always consists in their thoughts and
actions as socially constructed individuals."'
II. WILLS AS STORIES
Stories are one important way in which humans use their
shared culture to cross intersubjective bounds." "One fundamental
characteristic of human life is that we all tell stories, all the time,
about ourselves and others, both in the law and out of it."" This
phenomenon may explain how, despite all their differences, indi-
viduals communicate with the world of others quite successfully
much of the time.1" Through stories, individuals "take experience
and configure it in a conventional and comprehensible form."1 1
Just as individuals manage to speak across and through their
boundaries, so wills speak across time, despite their authors' ab-
sence."z If the law of wills were less wedded to traditional, mod-
ernist dichotomies between subjective and objective, between pri-
vate and public, it might understand wills as a form of storytelling:
Wills "tell" testators' stories about the disposition of their property
after death. Wills are but one more way in which individuals rely
on and use culture, which both "construct[s] and enable[s]
subjectivity"" to make and share meaning."
As with other stories, the will-story has a conventional form
and content; as with other stories, the will-story's conventional
form and content can be adapted in an almost infinite variety of
97. J.M. Balkin, The Promise of Legal Semiotics, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1831, 1848 (1991).
98. See Gerald P. Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1, 3 (1984) ("Human
beings think about social interaction in story form.").
99. WHITn, supra note 62, at 169.
100. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension, supra note 8, at 2245 (observing that "our
everyday experience consists of meaningful, even if imperfect, intersubjective communica-
tion").
101. 1& at 2228.
102. When it is colloquially said that "a will speaks at death," the emphasis tends to
be placed on the words "at death," highlighting the fact that the will's author is never
available to explain it. I suggest that the emphasis belongs on the verb.
103. Winter, supra note 2, at 1601.
104. Id. at 1607.
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ways to express an individual's unique ideas. The will's familiar
structure and subject make it recognizable to readers, telling them
in general what to expect. The will's pliant structure permits ex-
pression of innumerable variations on common themes. Readers of
a story do not seek merely to decode the meaning of words; nei-
ther should readers of a will. When a will's literal commands have
given rise to an interpretive dispute, we are more likely to effectu-
ate the testator's wishes-and thus to fulfill the accepted objectives
of wills law-by seeking the story behind those commands rather
than by seeking only to define the terms used in formulating the
commands.
A. The Will as a Story-Type or Stock Story
The understanding of wills as stories begins with an under-
standing that the conventional patterns of wills and the expecta-
tions they generate cannot help but have an impact on the reading
as well as on the writing of wills. Indeed, the activity of "interpret-
ing" a will would be incomprehensible without some preexisting
understanding of what a will is and does.1" Imagine a signed and





A reader confronting this paper can "find," among other things, a
poem, a meaningless scribble, a notation of graffiti seen in a pub-
lic restroom. An interpreter told that the paper is a holographic
will is likely to "find" a devise of the entirety of the testator's
property to a single individual to the exclusion of another.1" This
example suggests that wills function as a genre, "a conventional
function of language, a particular relation to the world which
105. The notion of will-making and will-reading as activities based on convention owes
something to the writings of Stanley Fish. See STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THis
CLASS? 268-92 (1980); Stanley Fish, Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory, 96 YALE
L. 1773 (1987).
For a thoughtful discussion of how social and legal conventions work, see Balkin,
supra note 82.
106. For a marvelous account of the confusion arising when such a paper is not clear-




serves as a norm or expectation to guide the reader in his encoun-
ter with the text."'" What an interpreter "finds" in a will is a
function not only of what the testator placed there, but also of
what the genre teaches must be in it.
Like testators, interpreters are aware of customary patterns of
disposition and have expectations about what the will is likely to
say." Although the doctrine and rhetoric of wills law makes
much of testators' freedom to be arbitrary or foolish in the dispo-
sition of property, the very notions of "arbitrariness" and "foolish-
ness" imply a concept of "regular" (not arbitrary) and "wise" (not
foolish) dispositions. In this sense, wills can be seen as a story-type
or stock story °" with "characters, story lines, and built-in resolu-
tions embody[ing] commonly shared cultural views about the way
things are and should be done . . ,,no Such stories "help us in-
terpret the everyday world with limited information and help us
make choices about asserting our own needs and responding to
other people..1 .
The perception of wills as a story-type or stock story helps
explain why and how individuals unsophisticated about law "know"
what a will is and what it does."' The use of stock stories "re-
solves ambiguity and complements 'given' information with much
'assumed'" information."".3 The will story-type is general and sche-
matic; it permits a limitless number of particular instantiations. 4
107. JONATHAN D. CULLER, STRUcruRALiST PoEnics 136 (1975).
108. Cf. Scheppele, supra note 58, at 2090 ("Observers, even those not directly in-
volved in a dispute, bring with them a conceptual scheme already formed, a set of pre-
suppositions and expectations, that influences what they see and report."); see also supra
note 81 and accompanying text.
109. See Lopez, supra note 98, at 3 (defining "stock story").
110. Id. at 9; see also WHrrE, supra note 62, at 172 (telling a story is never a purely
private act, but implies a community).
111. Lopez, supra note 98, at 3; see also Winter, The Cognitive Dimension, supra note
8, at 2233 (stock stories are used by individuals within a given culture to "organize the
diverse inputs of daily life into meaningful gestalts that relate that which is 'relevant' and
ignore that which is not").
112. See Winter, The Cognitive Dimension, supra note 8, at 2252 ("The narrator does
not tell his or her story from the raw, unmediated data of life, but rather assembles and
makes use of the preexisting cultural ICMs [Idealized Cognitive Models] with which he
or she apprehends the world. The narrator then configures these nuclei to form a recog-
nizable story-pattern with an apprehensible meaning.").
113. Lopez, supra note 98, at 6.
114. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension, supra note 8, at 2252-53; see also Balkin, supra
note 82, at 1151-52 (suggesting that although individuals in a society may share conven-
tions or ideologies, those individuals "do not share exactly the same beliefs").
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When making a will, the testator configures the individual ele-
ments of his own personal plan and expresses them in a manner
recognizable and comprehensible to the audience for which he
writes."'5 The will is then read with expectations formed by prior
wills-real or imagined."" The reader processes the individual
elements of a particular will by "fitting" them into the larger,
familiar story structure, and by comparing and contrasting them to
the elements he anticipates." ' What the reader anticipates affects
how she reads: what is likely to seem clear, is clear, what is likely
to seem unclear, is unclear."' Indeed, it is possible that interpre-
tive "problems" are most likely to be perceived when the will
departs from anticipated patterns.
B. The Story Behind the Commands of the Will
Testators have particular stories they seek to tell through the
will "stock." Sometimes these stories can be reduced to a set of
commands: "I give all my property [as a reward] to my [loyal] son
George." More often, the stories are richer, more detailed and
emotional, than can be captured fully in a set of instructions con-
cerning the disposition of property.
Where a will's verbal commands seem clear (in the sense of
being complete, comprehensible, and in accord with the reader's
expectations), the richness of the "under-story" can be comfortably
115. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension, supra note 8, at 2270; see also Lopez, supra
note 98, at 28 ("A storyteller . . . always makes assumptions about his audience ....
[A] storyteller originally shapes the narrative on the basis of the anticipated and imag-
ined 'proddings and promptings' of the audience .... ").
116. See Winter, The Cognitive Dimension, supra note 8, at 2252 ("The reader inevita-
bly transfuses the narrative with his or her own reconstructive effort, decoding the plot
and the message in relation to the ICMs [Idealized Cognitive Models] that the reader
brings to the process of understanding and interpretation.") (footnote omitted).
117. See BENNETr & FELDMAN, supra note 8, at 62 ("[S]tories . . . engage some
general cognitive models of social action against which particular networks of story con-
nections can be judged for completeness, consistency, and ambiguity."); see also Lopez,
supra note 98, at 15-20; Winter, The Cognitive Dimension, supra note 8, at 2272.
118. Cf. Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision
Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519 (1991). Professors Pennington and
Hastie point out:
[E]xpectations about the kinds of information necessary to make a story tell the
juror when important pieces of the explanation structure are missing and when
inferences must be made. Knowledge about the structure of stories allows the
juror to form an opinion concerning the completeness of the evidence, or the




ignored; the words of the will can be followed. But where a will's
words are unclear (incomplete, internally inconsistent, ambiguous,
at odds with expectations), the under-story is what we most want
to know. When we ask, with respect to a disposition alleged to be
ambiguous, "What was the testator trying to do?," we do not
mean, "Did the testator use a particular word in this sense or
that?" We mean, "What was he trying to accomplish here? What
is his story? Who were the people he loved?," and the like.
This desire to hear the story underneath the will accounts for
the persistent frustration with interpretive doctrines that, by mak-
ing the issue one of word-meaning, render much evidence of intent
substantively irrelevant.119 What we "know" of a testator (or any
other person or event) is a function of the evidence available to
us. To the extent that evidence is actually excluded, we will
"know" less, or differently.
Studies of courtroom and law-office interactions suggest that
clients 1 and witnessesn1 tend to see the "facts" in narrative or
story form, and that factfinders understand the evidence offered
them by assembling it into comprehensible stories."v Excluding
evidence of the will's under-story altogether, or admitting it (or
pieces of it) only in the word-meaning context," may deprive us
of what we actually need in order to come to know who the testa-
tor was as a person."' Knowing his story, in contrast, might per-
mit us to form an imaginative relationship with him, to make some
sort of connection.2'
119. See supra text accompanying notes 54-58.
120. See Sarat & Felstiner, supra note 68.
121. See William O'Barr & John Conley, Litigant Satisfaction Versus Legal Adequacy
in Small Claims Court Narratives, 19 L. & SOC'Y REv. 661, 665-67 (1985).
122. BENNETT & FELDMAN, supra note 8; Pennington & Hastie, supra note 118; see
also Maynard, supra note 65, at 476-77 ("[T]he major features of a case are not prior to
or independent of narratives; instead they come to life through narrative practices by
which a teller makes them manifest and a listener makes inferences and responds accord-
ingly.").
123. On the epistemological importance of the context in which evidence is admitted,
see Ronald . Allen, The Nature of Juridical Proof, 13 CARDozo L. REV. 373, 385-92
(1991) (contrasting probabilistic with historiographic approaches to evidentiary proof).
124. See Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574, 1592
(1987) (describing the use of narrative to create "affective understanding").
125. See Delgado, supra note 6, at 2412 ("[S]tories create their own bonds .... "); id.
at 2414 (stories can build community, consensus, "a common culture of shared under-
standings"); see also Joseph W. Singer, Persuasion, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2442, 2458 (1989)
("[P]ersuasion starts by creating a relationship between oneself and others ... [and]
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Consider the following will provisions:
THIRD: I give to my daughter.., any items of my personal
property including household furniture which she elects to take,
subject to the provision, however, that if my wife ... survives
me, my wife may enjoy the use of said personal property and
household furniture during her lifetime if my wife so elects.
FOURTH: All the rest, residue, and remainder of my estate,
both real and personal of whatever kind and nature, and where-
soever situated, I give, devise and bequeath to my wife ... to be
hers absolutely and forever.
Assume that the testator, who drew this will himself, owned no
real property at either the time the will was executed or the time
of his death. Assume further that the daughter and the wife
named as beneficiaries were unrelated: the daughter was the prod-
uct of a first marriage, which terminated with the death of the
testator's first wife, and the wife named in the will was the
daughter's stepmother, the testator's second wife.
A typical interpretive contest that might arise from a will of
this sort would involve the meaning of the term "personal proper-
ty" in clause "THIRD." In case after case involving wills with sim-
ilar provisions-and there is an alarmingly high number of
them -- the devisee of the personal property (the daughter, in
this scenario) claims that she is effectively the sole beneficiary of
the will. "Personal property," she typically argues, means all prop-
erty other than realty; there being no real property, all of the
testator's assets-including money, stocks and other intangibles as
well as tangible personalty-should pass to her if she "elects" to
take them.'
makes them aware of the connections they already have.").
126. The provision for the wife's life estate is unusual; the rest is fairly common. See,
e.g., Fitzgerald v. Salvation Army (In re Estate of Graham), 316 P.2d 945 (Cal. 1957).
Lamentably, many of the litigated wills were drafted by attorneys, and one of the issues
raised in the cases involving those wills is whether the court should admit evidence from
the scrivener. See, e.g., Lesher v. Florida Nat'l Bank of Gainesville (In re Estate of
Lesher), 365 So. 2d 815 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Breckner v. Prestwood, 600 S.W.2d
52 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980). In Estate of McKenna, 489 A.2d 862, 868 n.7 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1985), the court expressly chided counsel for failing "to use clear and precise language to
set forth the testator's intent."
127. In the cases where the estate includes real property, the devisee of the personal-
ty claims all the personal property, intangible as well as tangible.
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Courts are extremely unreceptive to such claims and hold in
the overwhelming majority of these cases that the devisee should
receive only items of tangible personalty.1" The reasoning used
across the large number of cases is remarkably similar. The issue
is framed as whether the testator used the words "personal proper-
ty" in their technical as opposed to their ordinary or colloquial
sense-i.e., the issue is framed as one concerning the meaning of
the words the testator used. Thus framed, the issue can almost
always be resolved by reference to the face of the will. The court
may invoke the doctrine of ejusdem generis, under which the gen-
eral term "personal property" is deemed to be qualified and limit-
ed by the particular illustrations that follow it.1 Alternatively,
the court may note that if "personal property" is interpreted
broadly, then the will's residuary clause will be rendered meaning-
less, violating the constructional maxim that courts should give
effect to all of a will's words, if possible."' Finally, the court may
find some other will provision that also seems to deal with person-
al property, thus making it unlikely that all the personalty had al-
ready been disposed of.. 31 And in those few cases that cannot be
resolved solely by reference to the face of the will, extrinsic evi-
128. 80 AM. JuR. 2D Wills § 1249 (1975) ("While it is clear that the term 'personal
property' is sufficiently broad ...to include all forms of property other than land ....
in a majority of cases the courts have ...construed the term as carrying a restricted
rather than a broad signification."). For a collection of cases, see Annotation, What Pass-
es Under the Term "Personal Property" in Will, 94 A.L.R.2d 1106 (1964). See also cases
cited infra notes 129-32.
129. See, eg., Bird v. Dishong (In re Estate of Home), 171 So. 2d 14, 16-21 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Leroy v. Kirk, 277 A.2d 611, 614-15 (Md. 1971); Breckner, 600
S.W.2d at 57; In re Estate of Weissenborn, 466 P.2d 536, 538-39 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970).
But see Martin v. First Nat'l Bank of Mobile, 412 So. 2d 250, 253 (Ala. 1982) (holding
principle of ejusdem generis does not apply where the executor is given express authority
to determine what objects of property are to be included in the description of "personal
property"); Hays v. Coe, 595 A.2d 484, 486-87 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (holding ejus-
dem generis inapplicable to devise of "all of my personal property, including but not lim-
ited to furniture and fixtures").
130. See, e.g., Fitzgerald, 316 P.2d at 947; Feighan v. Motto, 144 N.E.2d 510, 511
(Ohio Prob. Ct. 1955); McKenna, 489 A.2d at 866-67.
131. Se4 e.g., Breckner, 600 S.W.2d at 58; Lee v. Hale, 562 S.W.2d 190, 193 (Tenn.
1978). Compare Lesher, 365 So. 2d at 818 (holding that where the devise is of personal
property "'physically situated [in] Pennsylvania' . . . , [t]he term 'physically situated'
would tend to indicate that [the] term 'personal property' referred to tangible personal
property") with Jacoway v. Brittain, 360 So. 2d 306, 307-08 (Ala. 1978) (devise of "all
my personal property, located in my home, or on my property" held to include intangi-
ble assets at the bank where the passbook and the key to the safety deposit box were
on the testator's property).
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dence of intent to limit the gift to tangible personalty can be
smuggled in as one of the circumstances surrounding the testator
at the time of the will's execution"--a long-established exception
to the rule barring extrinsic evidence, which, as I discuss below, is
quite different from a storytelling approach."'
Now on one level, these approaches to the constructional issue
are predictable. They are exactly what one would expect under the
meaning-of-words model of will interpretation. And the results
reached do not seem wrong per se. By interpreting the words
"personal property" to mean "tangible personalty," the court en-
sures that in most cases all of the devisees get something. This
outcome seems fair, and it is more logical than finding, in effect,
that a testator bothered to name someone a beneficiary but ne-
glected to give anything to that person.
Yet on another level, the approaches taken by the courts are
just plain strange. Although the courts' opinions begin with the
usual homilies to the primacy of the testator's individual intent,
they in fact treat the wills as abstract and more-or-less fungible
puzzles into which all the word-pieces must be made to fit. A
capable lawyer can almost always manipulate either the "plain
meaning rule" or its numerous exceptions to permit investigation
of at least a few facts extrinsic to a will's language as long as she
can argue (and what capable lawyer cannot?) that the evidence is
being offered to explicate some word of the will.3 Squeezing
evidence into this limited word-meaning context is not a harmless
or neutral strategy.Y The focus remains on the words, not on the
complex motives by which they were produced. The discussions
are bloodless. One would hardly know that any actual people were
involved-only "testators," "beneficiaries," "scriveners," and "resid-
132. Se4 e.g., Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Wolfe, 91 S.E.2d 246, 250 (N.C. 1956);
McKenna, 489 A.2d at 866-67; see also Fitzgerald, 316 P.2d at 946 (holding that probate
code provision requiring that technical words in a will be taken in their technical sense,
unless it appears that the testator was unfamiliar with that sense, contemplates admission
of extrinsic evidence to assess whether the testator was acquainted with the technical
sense of the words used).
133. On the rule permitting extrinsic evidence to establish the circumstances surround-
ing the execution of the will, see supra note 57. On the differences between that rule
and the storytelling approach, see infra text accompanying notes 135-36.
134. See Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 11, at 529-35.
135. Cf. Scheppele, supra note 58, at 2097 ("[Flraming stories narrowly around 'the
trouble' at issue . . . [can] work to silence the accounts of outsiders . . ").
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uary devisees." And none of these folks have any discernible per-
sonalities at all.
Or maybe one only finds this strange if one already knows
the story of the will. In the case of the will quoted above, I know
it quite well: It is my father's. There are, it turns out, many facts
and circumstances that might help explain what my father thought
he was doing in those two convoluted paragraphs-facts about the
different kinds of personalty he owned, his relationships with me
and my stepmother, his understanding of the relationship my step-
mother and I had, and so on. Almost everyone with whom I have
spoken about the will has asked about these matters, and several
colleagues to whom I have shown this Essay have suggested that I
describe the facts here. But, of course, under the governing rules
and precedents none of these facts would matter much." That is
just my point. Left alone, we may think in terms of stories; when
we are unsure what was meant to happen, we may seek stories
out. The law proceeds otherwise. As the law sees him, my father
was just another testator, not a real man, and his story-all the
complex things he was and did-doesn't count. From where I sit,
it's a funny view of the freedom of testation.
Real people, not abstractions, write wills-and real people
read them. If wills law's individualist rhetoric is to be made mean-
ingful, interpretation must seek the human voice behind every will.
It will not find it in examining the usage of words; it will not find
-it in decoded commands. The human author of the will is to be
found in his story.
C. The Danger of Ignoring Individual Stories
Explanations of the meaning-of-words model of will interpre-
tation make much of the evils that might result if the will's words
are not made the sole focus. These explanations suggest a dichoto-
my between interpretive methodologies that are neutral, impartial,
reliable, and predictable, and those that are untrustworthy, biased,
and unreliable. This dichotomy is false. Some of the same forces
that limit the freedom of the testator also limit the freedom of the
reader. Neutrality, impartiality, reliability, and predictability are
themselves (contestable) values. To hold those values is to have a
136. As things worked out, they didn't: My stepmother and I settled the estate by
agreement. But that's another story.
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position, to be partial.137 "The 'neutral observer's' point of view is
no less a point of view than any other.""' To exclude or
marginalize the testator's story in the name of neutrality risks
exactly the imposition that the meaning-of-words model purports
to avoid. Someone's story will emerge from interpretation proceed-
ings; the only question is whose.
The factfinder (for simplicity's sake, call her a judge) in a will
interpretation case, like any other reader of any other text, nec-
essarily encounters the instrument "in a situation which unavoid-
ably includes the beliefs that the reader holds."'39 As a member
of a culture in which the making of wills is to some degree a
conventional activity, the judge, like the testator himself, is likely
to have expectations about the dispositive patterns to which the
will is going to conform, such as provisions for a surviving spouse
or for children." These beliefs form a context for even the most
literal readings of a willW4-a context all the more powerful be-
cause it tends to be unrecognized." "All decisionmaking makes
use of ideological constructions of social reality. What we call
'non-ideological' decisions are ideological decisions whose ideology
is simply not noticed."1' 3 This "outside" context or ideology can-
137. MINOW, supra note 89, at 376 ("Impartiality is the guise that partiality takes to
seal bias against exposure ...."); Martha Minow, The Supreme Court 1986
Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARv. L. REv. 10, 75 (1987); cf. Martha
Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, Passion for Justice, 10 CARDozo L. REV. 37, 52 (1988)
(expressing the view that a judge's aspirations to step beyond personal predilections are
for nought if the judge fails to challenge her own point of view).
On the ambiguity of the concept of partiality, see Baron, supra note 3, at 83 n.23.
138. Scheppele, supra note 58, at 2090.
139. Kenneth S. Abraham, Statutory Interpretation and Literary Theory: Some Common
Concerns of an Unlikely Pair, in INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE 115, 124 (San-
ford Levinson & Steven Mailloux eds., 1988); see also Kenneth L Karst, Judging and
Belonging, 61 S. CAL L. REV. 1957, 1957-58 (1988) (arguing that a judge cannot leave
her acculturation at the courtroom door).
140. See supra text accompanying notes 80-84.
141. See FISH, supra note 105, at 280 ("[A]ny reading that is plain and obvious in the
light of some assumed purpose (and it is impossible not to assume one) is a literal read-
ing; but no reading is the literal reading in the sense that [it] is available apart from any
purpose whatsoever.").
142. See Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL L. REV.
1597, 1605 (1990) ("Arguments over context . . .may wrongly imply that we can ever
escape context.").
143. Balkin, supra note 82, at 1153; see also Minow & Spelman, supra note 137, at 52
("The very aspirational language of impersonality and objectivity, while aiming to stretch
the judge beyond personal prejudices, denies the need to acknowledge the impact of
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not help but have an impact on what the judge then finds "inside"
the will.' "
Consider, for example, a will typed on a testator's home type-
writer making no provision for the testator's only child, Maxwell
A. Smith, but devising substantial property to "Maxwell S. Smith,"
a distant cousin of the testator. Most judges-most people-would
suspect a typographical error here. But what leads most readers to
consider the proximity of the "a" typewriter key to the "s" key
has nothing to do with the words of the will. Instead, what raises
the suspicion of error is the belief that people tend to (ought to?)
prefer their children to more distant relatives in distributing prop-
erty after death.
My point is not that this belief is wrong; indeed, there is
empirical support for it." Rather, my point is that this belief,
which is only a belief and which exists in the reader's mind inde-
pendently of any particular will, counts as a fact in interpreting a
will which appears to be at odds with it. Unless we are open to
the possibility of an "under-story" in this instance, we risk limiting
the testator's freedom (to disinherit a child1") under the guise of
effectuating it. "There is a real risk of imposing one's own per-
spective by claiming already to be impartial and objective-by
claiming, indeed, to be the kind of reasonable person whose stan-
dards provide the standards for judging the conduct of others. ' ' 47
I am suggesting that individuals' stories, in all their richness
and detail, can be used far more effectively than decoded words to
actualize the system's goal of testamentary freedom. The claim is
analogous to a claim sometimes made by outsiders and outsider
jurisprudence" 8 that stories can be used to challenge and reduce
one's own perspective in the process of trying to see another's point of view.").
144. Catharine Wells, Situated Decisionmaking, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1727, 1743 (1990)
("What we see and hear is filtered and interpreted within a cognitive framework that is
constructed largely from our own individual temperament and prior experience. Norma-
tive judgments in particular cases are strongly influenced by perceptions about the nature
of the controversy within this larger framework.") (footnote omitted).
145. See supra notes 80-81, 83 and accompanying text.
146. Pretermitted heir statutes do not prohibit disinheritance. Like the formalities of
the wills Act, the requirements of pretermitted child statutes purport merely to regulate
the form in which the intention to disinherit must be expressed. See, e.g., UNIFORM PRO-
BATE CODE § 2-302, 8 U.L.A. 90-91 (1983).
147. Minow & Spelman, supra note 137, at 52.
148. For a description and definition of these terms, see Matsuda, supra note 3, at
2323-26.
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the impact of the stereotypes or preconceptions that are instru-
mental to the perpetuation of power and domination in our
society.149 If "we construct social reality by devising and passing
on stories,"" then "those whose stories are believed have the
power to create fact; those whose stories are not believed live in a
legally sanctioned 'reality' that does not match their percep-
tions."'151 "Counterstories" can be used to "challenge the received
wisdom" and to show that "there are possibilities for life other
than the. ones we live."' " Such stories can attack complacency,
heighten awareness, and "enable the listener and the teller to
build a world richer than either could make alone." '
Similarly, in the context of will interpretation, admission of
the testator's story can help us see whether-and sometimes
why-a testator chose to depart from dispositive patterns that,
however frequently adopted by others, are not right for him. What
I have called the will's "under-story" can be used, like the
outsider's "counterstory," to "invest[] text with feeling" and to
give voice to those who can no longer express or explain their
emotions directly." By attending to stories as well as words, we
will hear "of persons and human meanings, not abstractions.
1 55
Sometimes stories will be unnecessary. Most cases will not be
contested. However "remote" the words of attorney-drafted instru-
ments may be from the ordinary stories told by the testator in his
own words,' 6 the "legal words" can function tolerably well to
149. See Delgado, supra note 6, at 2413 ("For many minority persons, the principal
instrument of their subordination . . . is the . . . mindset by means of which members of
the dominant group justify the world as it is, that is, with whites on top and browns and
blacks at the bottom.") (footnotes omitted).
The ideas in this and the following paragraph are developed in a slightly different
context in Baron, supra note 3, at 97-100.
150. Delgado, supra note 6, at 2415.
151. Scheppele, supra note 58, at 2079 (footnotes omitted); see also Ball, supra note 3,
at 2280-81 (suggesting that "[t]here is an American story of origins" and that while this
story has "proved, at times, wonderfully transformative," it has also proved to be
"sometimes incapacious, a rhetorical mode for closure and resistance to inclusiveness").
152. Delgado, supra note 6, at 2414; see also Matsuda, supra note 3, at 2324 (describ-
ing a methodology that attempts "to know history from the bottom").
153. Delgado, supra note 6, at 2439.
For reservations about the potential of storytelling alone to effect change, see Ball,
supra note 3, at 2281, and Baron, supra note 3, at 100-04.
154. See Delgado, supra note 6, at 2440.
155. Henderson, supra note 124, at 1592.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 60-64.
66719921
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
achieve dispositive objectives. Indeed, this is the result for which
so many responsible estate planners strive, and mostly succeed. In
contrast to the dilemmas posed by wills like my father's, no one
wished to bring interpretive proceedings concerning my father-in-
law's will, for despite the complexity, obscurity, and legalism of its
provisions, it accomplished exactly the ends he had in his own
words stated to be those he desired. Put another way, the result of
the will's technical commands tracked perfectly the story we un-
derstood to be underneath the will. The question is not what to
do about the wills whose language "works" in this way. The ques-
tion is what to do when the words are themselves confused or
when the outcome is different from that which the survivors (and
sometimes the scrivener) were led to expect. Here is where we
need to be open, not just to word use, but to stories.
Acceptance of stories will not necessarily change the outcome
in all--or even in many-of those cases that are contested." In
some instances, there may be no way to know the testator's story,
and thus no story to tell; the testator may not have spoken of his
dispositive plans, nor recorded them in extrinsic documents such as
memoranda or letters. In other cases, there may be too many
conflicting stories, with no way to sort among them accurately.'
Finally, the story that emerges may be a tale of ambivalence, of
the testator's inability to make the clear and final choices that the
meaning-of-words model of interpretation contemplates. My
father's will probably falls into this category.5 9
Yet while the gains from attending to stories may be specula-
tive, the losses from ignoring them are not. The human aspects of
the testator and his aspirations are lost in the meaning-of-words
157. Nor is there need to worry that openness to stories will increase the number of
contests brought. This concern has been raised repeatedly in the analogous context of
mistake correction, and it may be answered in the eloquent words of Justice Ellen Peters
as follows: "There is no doubt that our increasingly fact-based jurisprudence serves to
expose many apparently final dispositions to the juridical risk of unjustified judicial in-
tervention. In the law of contracts, where the parol evidence rule has undergone consid-
erable erosion, this risk has not been found to be unmanageable." Connecticut Junior
Republic v. Sharon Hosp., 448 A.2d 190, 201 (Conn. 1982) (Peters, 3., dissenting) (foot-
note omitted).
158. In the analogous context of mistake correction, Professors Langbein and
Waggoner argue that a "clear and convincing evidence" standard can be used as a safe-
guard where extrinsic evidence is received. See Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 11, at
526. Under such a standard, the will's "literal" meaning would prevail if the "stories"
were truly in conflict.
159. For another example, see Grey, supra note 106, at 234.
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model. If testation is to be more than a game playable only by
those who are sophisticated and receive able legal advice, then it
is worth working to regain those human aspects. "[T]he quality of
the human response [in a decision] is itself a dimension of sub-
stantive justice . . . ."" We cannot, then, do justice without
heightening decisionmakers' sensitivity to the human beings affect-
ed by their decisions. People are not merely the sum of their writ-
ten words. By attending to testators' stories, we can build into the
interpretive process "the pluralism that it is the business of the
courts to protect and the respect for persons that it is the business
of the courts to enforce."161
III. POTENTIAL Is NOT PRAcTIcE
If there is any legal field in which the appropriateness of
attending to individuals' stories would seem to be obvious, one
would think it would be the area of will interpretation. Wills law's
notion of a will as the expression of a unique individual's own
wishes would seem to commit it to a search for the testator's
special, personal circumstances. Yet the doctrines in this area do
not encourage the view that a will is a story, and may exclude
evidence of the actual story underlying a will's verbal commands.
If it is difficult for the law to sanction the telling and hearing of
stories in a field whose object is the effectuation of individual
wishes, how likely is it that storytelling will achieve its
transformative potential in other, "public" law, contexts?62 An-
swering this question involves speculation about why will interpre-
tation doctrines seem to stray so far from the ostensible goals of
wills law.
One way to begin this speculation is to examine what it is
that makes the modernist, meaning-of-words model of will inter-
160. Minow & Spelman, supra note 137, at 70.
161. Scheppele, supra note 58, at 2098.
162. As noted supra text accompanying notes 3-7, storytelling has been proposed as,
among other things, a political strategy by which to empower oppressed groups whose
voices and claims have been marginalized by virtue of their position "outside" of the
mainstream of American legal culture. I do not mean to argue that the stories of testa-
tors and of oppressed groups are necessarily alike. On the other hand, both types of sto-
ries are alike resisted. My thought is that if we can understand the resistance to stories




pretation seem attractive on any level. As explained earlier," the
meaning-of-words model, based in liberal individualism, requires
self-reliance in the use of language. Words can be harnessed to the
achievement of the author's ends, and, the model asserts, they
should be. In theory, the exclusion of extrinsic evidence unrelated
to word use is meant to ensure that, ultimately, words will be so
harnessed-if not by this testator, at least by others, who can learn
from this testator's failure."
This argument has a certain appeal in the abstract, where
what matters is what people are theoretically capable of," not
their actual abilities or situation. In this abstract realm, everyone is
as competent as everyone else: All will-writers can write plainly;
all will-readers can read what has been written; everyone can
protect himself against imposition. In this realm of abstractly
shared, equal abilities, the moral norm of self-reliance makes a
good deal of sense."
Of course, the will interpretation context is not the abstract
realm depicted and required by the self-reliance norm. The will's
author, being unable to communicate in the present, does not
stand on equal footing with the will's reader; the dead and the
living are not equally powerful. The writing of a will is an act of
trust, an "accepted vulnerability" to others.167 The prevalence of
self-reliance rhetoric in the will interpretation context may function
to blind us to these facts." The doctrinal model frames what is
163. See supra text accompanying notes 85-90.
164. The standard arguments about using form correctly, of which this argument is but
an example, as well as the parallels between such arguments, arguments for self-reliance,
and the ideal of individualism, are ,presented in Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in
Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. Rnv. 1685, 1697-701, 1737-40 (1976).
165. Of course it is questionable whether this sort of self-reliance in language use is
possible even as a theoretical matter. See, e.g., FISH, supra note 105, at 284 ("A sentence
is never not in a context. We are never not in a situation . . . . A set of interpretive
assumptions is always in force. A sentence that seems to need no interpretation is al-
ready the product of one."); Drucilla Cornell, Convention and Critique, 7 CARDOZO L.
REV. 679, 689 (1968) ("The very commonness of language renders language essentially
independent of an individual's intention to give it meaning").
166. See Annette Baier, Trust and Antitrust, in FEMINISM & POLITICAL THEORY 279,
297 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 1990) (A conception of morality "as essentially a matter of
keeping to the minimum moral traffic rules, designed to restrict close encounters between
autonomous persons to self-chosen ones . . . presupposes both an equality of power and
a natural separateness from others.").
167. Id. at 283.
168. See Olsen, supra note 9, at 1529 (The images created by legal rhetoric "limit[]
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actually an imbalance of power and a relationship of trust between
differently situated human persons as a compact or contract be-
tween equally capable word-users. It thus allows us to avoid the
very difficult task of reexamining the self-reliance norm and de-
veloping a new norm more appropriate to a relationship of "un-
avoidable inequality."'69
Similarly, the meaning-of-words model presents will interpreta-
tion as a problem for which we have fairly well-developed under-
standings (if not solutions), i.e., a problem of "constraint."'' In
the meaning-of-words model, the testator's meaning (which is not
necessarily the same as his "intention") is in the will and must be
brought out through some process that keeps it pure of the ideas
or preferences of readers. As with, say, constitutional interpre-
tation, the concern is that the wrong person's unchecked subjectivi-
ty-the reader's, the judge's-will control; and the search is for
some rule that will rein in that subjectivity." We may not yet
have found the right rule-we still debate the appropriate scope of
judicial review in constitutional law and of deference to legislative
will in statutory interpretation cases. But the problem is one with
which we have grown familiar, even comfortable.
Yet the traditional formulation of the problem of "constraint"
only holds up if there is a "correct" subjectivity to which we must
defer and an "objective" methodology by which to find it; and in
the case of will interpretation, we are taught that the "correct"
subjectivity is the testator's." However, when we abandon tradi-
and impoverish[] the ways we experience our affective and productive lives, the possibili-
ties we can imagine for restructuring our shared existence, and the manner in which we
attempt change.").
169. Baier, supra note 166, at 301.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 89-90.
171. See Schlag, supra note 91, at 920 (noting that one "conventional effect of the
inside/outside distinction" is that "it essentializes what is on the inside and separates 'it'
from what is relegated to the outside") (footnote omitted).
172. Again, the emphasis is on constraint:
[In one modelI social reality consists of social rules .... Like physical con-
straints, social and legal rules keep us from doing what we want to do. The
idea of constraint evokes the image of a prisoner who must be physically pre-
vented from doing what she chooses to do. If the constraint were absent, the
prisoner would spring into action according to her own desires and choices.
Balkin, supra note 82, at 1140.
173. In the realm of constitutional interpretation, there is no shared agreement that
the Framers' intention(s) must control. There is, however, fairly wide agreement that
interpretation must be in some sense "principled" and cannot be based solely on the
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tional modernist notions of liberal individuality, and accept that
"our individual reality is socially constructed in and through dia-
logue with others,"'74 it is clear that there is a problem with both
halves of this modernist formulation. As a result, the inquiry
changes. The question becomes one of the relationship between
individual preferences (the "correct" subjectivity) and the social
forces that help construct those wishes. In a less modernist vision,
"individual preferences ... would have already and necessarily
been constructed by social forces," including norms never con-
sciously considered by either the writer or the reader of the
will.' "Once the social construction of the subject becomes the
basic assumption of jurisprudence, one is less concerned with how
constraint is possible than with how undesirable forms of blindness
can be avoided."'76
Now this problem, the problem of dealing with a partiality
that is both inevitable"7 and invisible, 78 is not one with which
we are particularly familiar or comfortable. Justice in our rule of
law culture has traditionally been defined in terms of indepen-
dence, disengagement, and lack of bias.'79 If these qualities are
unattainable, our conceptions of justice must be changed."w The
goal to be sought would not be "objectivity" in interpretation, but
consciousness of the multiplicity of ways in which the same event
can be perceived, 8' and open, caring acknowledgment of the
judge's personal political preferences. See, e.g., Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules
Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARv. L. REv. 781
(1983).
174. Drucilla L. Cornell, Institutionalization of Meaning, Recollective Imagination and
the Potential for Transformative Legal Interpretation, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1135, 1145
(1988); see also supra text accompanying notes 95-96.
175. Balkin, supra note 82, at 1142.
176. Ld. (footnote omitted).
177. See Minow & Spelman, supra note 137, at 52 ("[E]ach human being is unavoid-
ably situated in his or her own experience."); Judith A. Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist
Reconsiderations of the Aspirations of Our Judges, 61 S. CAL L. REv. 1877, 1943 ("Im-
partiality and disengagement can never be achieved, hence all judgment is (sub rosa) sus-
pect, hence we 'are always living in a second best world in which we cover our tracks
with doctrines of insulation.").
178. See Abrams, supra note 6, at 975-7.6 ("The ostensible 'neutrality' of the law dis-
guises the extent to which it is premised on the perspectives of the powerful .... );
Balkin, supra note 82, at 1148 ("Sometimes racist and sexist attitudes are consciously
articulated .... However, more often they are unconscious.").
179. Resnik, supra note 177, at 1882.
180. See Baron, supra note 3, at 104-05.
181. As Professor Scheppele puts it:
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choice of which account will prevail." These new aspirations are
a huge departure from the conventional vision of the goals of in-
terpretation. Indeed, they envision an open embrace of choices
that the traditional vision denies can ever properly be made.
A final thread in the tapestry of reasons why wills law em-
braces the meaning-of-words model of interpretation, and seems so
resistant to storytelling, draws on the fact that a signal feature of
wills is that they dispose of property." As has frequently been
noted, there is no doubting the association in our legal and social
theory between property and modernist, liberal notions of individ-
ual autonomy.1" That idea of autonomy sees in dispositions of
property exercises of "freedom," defined as individually generated,
self-controlled choices.1"
There is nothing foreordained about this view of the self and
its choices.1" Nor is it always or necessarily helpful to us. Indeed,
it may be dysfunctional, for it may wrongly cause us to "doubt
anyone's ability to know, or care knowingly, for another," and on
this false basis we may "consign ourselves to the impoverished
state of disconnection from all except our most intimate compan-
ions."' Yet whereas psychological disconnection and separation
Stories can be told many ways, and even stories that lead to very different
legal conclusions can be different plausible and accurate versions of the same
event. It may make sense, then, to think that the presence of these different,
competing versions of a story is itself an important feature of the dispute at
hand that courts are being called upon to resolve.
Scheppele, supra note 58, at 2097.
182. Wells, supra note 144, at 1746.
183. But see ATKINSON, supra note 72, at 2-3 ("[Wlhile wills usually dispose of prop-
erty, this is not necessarily true. ... [A] will may simply appoint a guardian ... or
merely revoke former wills.") (footnotes omitted).
The ideas in this paragraph were first developed in Jane B. Baron, Do We Believe
in Generosity?: Reflections on the Relationship Between Gifts and Exchanges, 44 U. FLA.
L. REV. (forthcoming 1993).
184. -Se4 e.g., Fellows, supra note 12, at 611 n.1 ("No one disputes the influence of
individualism on the Western concept of property."); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in
Property Law, 40 STAN. L. Rnv. 577, 605 (1988) ("[lit seems no coincidence that the
doctrines of fixed promisekeeping and fixed property entitlements developed more or less
contemporaneously with a social theory that originally envisioned a radical separateness
among human beings.").
185. See Baron, supra note 183.
186. See Pierre Schlag, "Le Hors De Texte C'est Moi": The Politics of Form and the
Domestication of Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZO L. REv. 1631, 1670 (1990) (suggesting that
the view of the self as "autonomous, originary, integrated .. . [and] self-directive" is the
product of ideology).
187. MINOW, supra note 89, at 227.
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may be the negative sides of the idea of freedom-as-choices, there
is another side to this vision-a side that can be seen as positive.
Where freedom is defined in terms of individual choices, each
individual is relatively free of moral or political responsibility to
others. People exercise their freedom by making their own choices,
and while they alone must bear the consequences of choices that
turn out to be poor, they have no obligation to share the gains re-
sulting from choices that prove to be good."r
Recognizing the very different choices we face as individuals
constituted by-and not isolated from-society need not undercut
our vision of ourselves as free. That recognition requires, however,
a different definition of freedom: "To argue that we are immersed
in an already constituted form of life does not negate our respon-
sibility to it or our rebellion against it. Our form of life may have
an alienating, theatrical quality; but we are still the actors and
actresses.""'
This form of freedom is neither familiar nor comforting; in-
deed, to eyes accustomed to seeing freedom as wholly self-deter-
mined choices, it barely looks like freedom at all. "We get queasy
when we view the personality of others to be constituted merely
by a series of staged performances."1" Moreover, the new under-
standing of freedom that accompanies the vision of a socially con-
stituted self carries with it awesome responsibilities. If the indi-
vidual is not wholly determined by social forces,19 and the rela-
188. See, e.g., id. at 299 (A widely accepted conception of rights relies on the idea
that the rights-bearing person is an autonomous individual capable of exercising choice
for personal ends.); Kennedy, supra note 164, at 1713 (The self-reliant individualist holds
a firm conviction that "I am entitled to enjoy the benefits of my efforts without an obli-
gation to share or sacrifice them to the interests of others.") (footnote omitted).
189. Drucilla Cornell, "Convention" and Critique, 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 679, 691
(1986); see also Balkin, supra note 97, at 1848 ("[I]f language is always social, and if
freedom consists in activity as a socially constructed individual, then socially constructed
and channelled forms of discourse should be seen as empowering rather than merely
confining.").
190. Robert C. Post, On the Popular Image of the Lawyer: Reflections in a Dark
Glass, 75 CAL L. REV. 379, 387 (1987) (footnote omitted).
For a less negative view of the connection between the self and the social roles it
plays, see Steven L. Winter, Contingency and Community in Normative Practice, 139 U.
PA. L. REV. 963, 986-91 (1991).
191. See Balkin, supra note 82, at 1137 ("[T]oo great an emphasis on the social con-
struction of the subject leads . . . to determinism.").
Some scholars seem to embrace this possibility. See, e.g., Schlag, supra note 92, at
1721 ("Currently, every human contact between selves who are declared, ab initlo, to be
self-directing and already free is mediated and constructed by techno-bureaucratic strate-
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tion between self and social structure is truly dialectical," then
each individual must be to some degree accountable for our social
practices-our law, our culture, our politics.1  Liberal visions of
freedom may leave us psychologically disconnected, but they im-
pose relatively few moral burdens. The alternative vision empha-
sizes each individual's connection to and construction by communi-
ty," but imposes vague, potentially- overwhelming moral respon-
sibilities to create and recreate our selves and our social world all
the time.
Of course, if freedom does mean being able to act without
responsibility to others, then the freedom that storytelling invites
us to embrace is not really freedom at all. Yet even the liberal
idea of freedom is not a freedom devoid of responsibility: "Liber-
alism is the invitation to act in a self-interested manner, without
impediment from other people, as long as what we do does not
harm them." '195 Liberals and critics of liberalism have long debat-
ed the scope and nature of this limitation, but no one has serious-
ly questioned its existence or importance. If freedom and responsi-
bility are intertwined even in the liberal account, then it does not
seem an impossible leap to define our freedom as individuals in
terms of responsibilities to others. The point is not, of course, to
rescue or reinvigorate liberal notions of freedom, but to recognize
that alternative visions-though unfamiliar and untried-are not
unthinkable.
To summarize, resistance to storytelling may derive less from
the attractiveness of modernist liberalism than from fear of alter-
natives to it. It is not easy to re-think moral norms, to recognize
gies.").
192. See Balkin, supra note 82, at 1137 ("Individual thought, belief, desire, and action
are shaped and constructed by social structures, which in turn are the product of previ-
ous individual thought, belief, desire, and action.").
193. See MINOW, supra note 89, at 309 ("Interpreting rights as features of relation-
ships, contingent upon renegotiations within a community committed to this mode of
solving problems, pins law not on some force beyond human control but on human re-
sponsibility for the patterns of relationships promoted or hindered by this process.");
Williams, supra note 33, at 495 ("The ultimate message of the new epistemology is ...
that ethical choices are ours to make, and that we must accept responsibility for the con-
straints and choices we have embodied in the law.").
194. See Winter, supra note 190, at 991 ("There is . . . no separation between the self
and its communities. Self and community are mutually constitutive.") (footnote omitted).
195. Joseph W. Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from
Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 975, 980 (emphasis added).
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the inherent biases of the most well-intentioned "objective" ap-
proaches to decisions, or to re-envision freedom in terms that are
capable of making every individual responsible for every other.
Inside, the ubiquitous and familiar-feeling practices of storytelling
lie deep challenges.
The transformative potential of storytelling is, I think, real.
Storytelling relies for its intelligibility on individuals' situatedness
within culture. Understanding the interdependence of self and
culture invites us to re-think the kind of society we wish to make
and be made by. Yet nothing ensures that this invitation will be
accepted.
Stories may, simply, be difficult to hear. The will story-type
can serve as an example. Structurally, the story is about specific
people-flesh-and-blood men and women whose least-defining
roles, during life, were that of "testator" and "devisee." The story
is also, usually, about property-but not property as an abstract
concept or institution. Rather, the will often "speaks" of objects
(such as wedding rings and rocking chairs) or places (such as
homes and farms) that may have been integral to the testator's
self-definition1" and whose transmission may establish or affirm a
relationship to another. The story, whenever written, is heard in
the context of death. The rich texture of the story-its emotion
and particularity-can help connect us to the person the testator
was,1 ' but at the same time renders us specifically and immedi-
ately vulnerable to the pain of losing that person. Do we wish to
be reminded of our closeness, of the qualities and complexities of
our relationships (loving, angry, tumultuous, etc.), at the very
moment of loss?
Nor is it easy to bear the responsibilities that the advocates of
storytelling would have us accept. Again, the testator's story can
serve as an example. The testator has his own unique style of
word use, but also-and more important-countless other attrib-
utes and characteristics that we think of as forming his personality.
To attend to his story, and not merely the words of the will, is in
effect to define his identity."8 It is probably better to be honest
196. See Margaret . Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).
197. Cf Delgado, supra note 6, at 2438 ("Stories are the oldest, most primordial
meeting ground in human experience. Their allure will often provide the most effective
means of overcoming otherness. ... )
198. See Martha Minow, Identities, 3 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 97, 127 (1991) ("[A]s
people with the power to use language and state authority, lawyers and judges may influ-
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about this fact than to hide behind methodologies that are pur-
portedly neutral but actually distorting." But how many of
us-let alone the legal system-want explicitly to acknowledge this
sort of responsibility?
Wills law is ostensibly committed to the effectuation of indi-
vidual wishes. Few other areas of law share this commitment, even
at the rhetorical level.' If we cannot negotiate the obstacles pre-
sented by our simultaneous vulnerability to and power over others
in the realm of will interpretation, will we do better elsewhere?
Just as death makes it difficult to face questions of identity ex-
plicitly in the wills context, "difference"'  may create the same
difficulty in other contexts, particularly the. "public" law contexts
in which, it has been argued, storytelling is most needed.' As
Professor Delgado has asserted, stories may "humanize us [and]
emphasize our differences in ways that can ultimately bring us
closer together."' But as he has also recognized, the more a sto-
ry varies from the norm either in content or style, the harder it is
for "insiders" to hear' Exactly those qualities that make outsid-
ers "different" may make their stories inaccessible to those who
most need to hear them: "The claims of outsiders are often not
heard in law because the experiences and reactions and beliefs and
values that outsiders bring to the law are not easily processed in
the traditional structures of legal narratives. ' The question is
not whether stories will be told, but whose story will domi-
nate-and this is a problem of power, not of ignorance.'
ence the identities of others and in so doing shape their own identities.") (footnote omit-
ted).
199. See Minow, supra note 137, at 75 ("Acknowledging partiality may cure the pre-
tense of impartiality . . . .[W]e then have a choice of which partial view to advance or
accept.").
200. Contract doctrine comes close. Yet as has frequently been observed, see supra
note 24 and accompanying text, the foreseeable reliance of each party on the words of
the agreement distinguishes contracts in significant respects from wills.
201. For a penetrating analysis of difference as the product of a comparison with a
usually unstated, unperceived norm, see Minow, supra note 137, at 31-57.
202. See, ag., Delgado, supra note 6; Matsuda, supra note 3; Williams, supra note 3.
203. Delgado, supra note 6, at 2440.
204. Id. at 2429-31.
205. Scheppele, supra note 58, at 2097. For examples of this phenomenon, see sources
cited supra note 3.
206. See Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New
Words, Old Wounds?, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2099, 2116 (1989) ("Modem American trial pro-




My father and father-in-law have been dead, and therefore
silent, for some time now. I sought their stories after they died for
the same reason I listened to them speak while they lived: I cared.
Confronting their stories has nonetheless been difficult. Particularly
in the case of my father's will-a study in both ambiguity and
ambivalence-I was tempted to throw up my hands in despair ("I
just cannot figure this out."). If it is easy to stop trying to under-
stand even one so close, it is even easier to ignore those who are
seen-by virtue of death or of difference-as "other." Storytelling
may help us to build bridges, to connect with those others, to care.
Ironically, I suspect that the caring must come first.
lemma lies in the realization that all stories cannot dominate, and that the law often
privileges the stories of the powerful and drowns out the voices of the weak and margin-
al.") (footnote omitted).
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